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ABSTRACT
In essence, I have attempted a two - fold objective in 
this paper; the first, to contribute something concrete 
toward the establishment of a more exact and meaningful! 
"science" of politics, and in the second instance, to 
provide a clearer understanding of the actual decision 
making process in contemporary communist last European 
society*
With regard to the former goal, I have devised a 
"model" which I feel integrates in a fruitful and novel 
way innovative aspects of social sciences which are 
relevant to the phenomena studied. The model adopts as 
its theoretical unit of study the national "system" level 
of decision making and is thus based upon the premises 
and logics of "structural - functional" analysis. In 
addition, the model employs the decision making unit or 
"variable" as the focus of empirical investigation, sub­
stantiated by the decision theory of the "economic rationale" 
The former is intended to describe and explain the "what", 
the "how" and the "when" of certain political decision 
behaviour in communist East Europe, while the latter is 
particularly useful in deriving the "why".
In conjunction with these elements of theoretical 
analysis, I have proposed, as the most realistic and 
productive source of raw data, socio - political empirical
iii
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behaviour. The systemized assimilation, organization and 
interpretation of such behaviour, together with its 
explanation in terms of the theoretical units of analysis, 
best summarizes that general social science approach 
which currently travels under the name of "behaviouralism".
It is ray hope and expectation that this particular inte­
gration of theory and fact will lead to a political 
"science" which is not only useful in observation, 
description and explanation of adverse social phenomena, 
but also in their prediction, prevention and control.
With respect to my second objective, i.e. the clear 
understanding of the communist decision making process 
at the national level, I feel that the model not only 
contributes to one's idea of what is actually "going on" 
in communist societies, but more fundamentally, the "how" 
and the "why" of a great deal of their behaviour. Of 
particular significance is the emphasis on the interdiscip­
linary relationships between significant "variables" of 
political behaviour which form part of the political structure 
"per se" and those variables which inhabit the environment 
within which the political structure must function.
Although time and space prevented a special treatment of 
the more specifically sociological factors, this inter­
relationship remains a theme throughout.
Therefore the model will focus more precisely on the 
political aspects of decision making while at the same
iv
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time attempt to discover the interractions between the political 
and non - political features which account for the differences 
between the polarities of the "orthodox" and "liberal" communist 
orientations, between the "true People's Republic" and the 
"reactionary state", and between the stable and "safe" soc­
ialist society and a dangerous form of "crisis - provoking" 
communism.
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INTRODUCTION
During the night of August 20 - 21, 1968, Soviet 
military forces, together with units of other Warsaw Pact 
allies, invaded Czechoslovakia. Such an event broke nearly 
ten years of relative calm in socialist East Europe in a 
fashion which raised many questions concerning modern, 
industrialized, post - war communism.
On the superficial level, one may ask "What was the 
'real' purpose of the invasion?" "What precisely did the 
Soviet Union (nominally the Warsaw Pact Alliance) expect 
or even hope to gain by such an uncivilized act?" "What 
exactly was Czechoslovakia's 'crime' which warranted such 
an imposition by military force?" Quite clearly, these 
questions barely scratch the surface of the more basic and 
substantive matters which must be investigated to render 
any answers to them truly meaningful.
One must further examine the underlying socio - economic 
and political features which have given rise to such a 
crisis. What are the environmental factors and relationships 
which characterize a "stable" and "peaceful" communism in 
today's industrial world? What are the socio - political 
bases for the current "orthodox" communist practices on the 
one hand, and the distinct "liberal" orientation on the other? 
What are the structural relationships between the political 
and the non - political aspects of East European communism
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2which account for one nation's being "in tune" and 
"harmonizing" with the ^socialist realities" and receiving
the rewards therefrom, while another nation is simultaneously 
labelled as"Reactionary", "revisionist", infested with 
"enemies of the people", and subjected to the penalties of 
non - conformity?
Satisfactory answers to these more fundamental questions 
are hard to come by. The analytical equipment of the 
contemporary social scientist is barely sufficiently sophis­
ticated to precisely pinpoint the problems and give some 
general direction for their solution, let alone provide for 
a set of "pat" answers which are at once realistic and 
workable. If this were the case, social phenomena would 
be adequately predictable and effectively controllable 
such that serious conflicts could be avoided in the first 
instance.
While such a "science" is the more ultimate goal of 
many sodlal and political theorists, I must state at the 
outset that my efforts here have not been directed toward 
such an ambitious objective. Although I do claim that 
there are some predictive and control merits to the 
theoretical construct which I present, my main purpose 
has been analytical and explanatory in nature. I believe 
that the "model" which I have created:portrays quite 
accurately the political decision making process in the 
communist societies in question, both in its national and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5international applications. Such, a theory also throws 
considerable light upon the more fundamental interactions 
and relationships between political and social factors 
which have remained in the shadows for some time.
It is also my intention that the model presented 
will provide the reader with a theoretical and structural 
framework by which he can more easily and accurately 
locate, observe, describe and explain the more fundamental 
questions having roots in the political and social 
environment of contemporary communist societies. In
effect, I hop* that this theory, and those which may grow
out of it, will prepare much of the theoretical and
methodological groundwork prerequisite to a more complete 
and ideal science of politics, characterized not only by 
the capacities of description, explanation and measurement 
of adverse social phenomena, but also of their prediction, 
prevention and control.
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4THE THEORY OF COMPARATIVE FUNCTIONALISM
A. THE BACKGROUND OF THE COMPARATIVE MODEL
The synthesis of comparative politics and model theory 
is a relatively new innovation in political science. Compar­
ative government, as an approach to understanding different 
types of political decision making, has existed since the 
time of the Greek city state, especially with the simplistic 
tri-partite Aristotelian classification of political 
systems. The comparative effort in politics however, 
has since experienced considerable academic "ebb and flow" 
over the centuries and even the "high water marks" have 
been substantially lacking in both content and form to 
adequately explain the political phenomena for which they 
were devised.
Since World War II however, with the complexities of 
political life evolving therefrom, comparative politics 
has once again risen to the challenge. Perhaps the most 
significant post-war development in this regard has been 
the emersion of the new "third world" states in world 
politics. Of paramount importance have been, firstly, 
the artificial political divisions in Africa, the Middle 
East, and Asia; secondly, the many pre-war colonial 
territories gaining independence; and thirdly the 
"liberation" of several areas, notably China, and the 
remoulding of others in a communist form, such as the 
communist regimes of Eastern Europe.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5
A second post-war phenomenon acting as a catalyst in
the resurgence of comparative politics has been the trend 
towards a much larger governmental participation in the 
affairs of most societies, thus in a sense producing at 
least a qualitatively new type of politics not unaccompanied 
by its own peculiar problems and phenomena.
The third post-war development signalling the new 
comparative movement has been the re-establishment of 
"internationalism**, especially by the major beneficiaries 
of the war, the United States and the Ü.S.S.R. For political 
scientists this has produced whole new areas of study such 
as "bloc politics", international alignments and realign­
ments, new forms of diplomacy, and a host of others.
Needless to say, these political developments were accompanied 
by and intermingled with the parallel integrational trends 
in other disciplines, especially the physical and military 
sciences, communications and economics.
The overall result has been a truly earth shaking 
"web" of developments, both within and between states, 
which has caused staggering new formations and reformations 
of political orders. The existing post-war "science" of 
political life became increasingly inadequate both as a 
description and explanation of the new political forms 
and activity, and especially as a methodology for encountering 
and treating the new political phenomena. Consequently, the 
political scientists responded generously with new theories.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6new descriptions, new approaches, and new methodologies 
as arms to analytically explain and control the "new 
politics". The political scientists' post-war arsenal 
(which is still accumulating) is best characterized by 
the new reinforcements with which he has allied himself —  
the sociologist, the psychologist, and the economist 
being of special importance. With them th%y brought 
theories, constructs, definitions, verbiage and methodologies, 
both new and old, giving the new political science a 
distinctively eclectic and multi-variate trend which 
shows no sign of fatigue.
Although my main task here is to establish the 
theoretical basis and rationale for the model which I 
have adopted, it will be useful to briefly scan the major 
implications of the analytical and procedural equipment 
which has been at the disposal of the post-war political 
scientist. Although this survey is not meant to be by 
any means exhaustive, I feel it is broad enough to blanket 
the field generally and perhaps provide some contextual 
meaning to the approach which I have chosen and help the 
reader to more clearly identify the model relative to the 
alternative choices which were available to me.
James C. Charleswor-bh, in the introduction to his 
recent anthologyi provides what is perhaps the most
1. J. C. Charlesworth (ed.). Contemporary Political
is, (New York, **
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7extensive nominal list of "schools" of thought, both
historical and contemporary. In addition, he categorizes 
their approaches as either a "methodology" or as an "objective", 
the significance of which I will examine shortly. All in all, 
Charlesworth runs the whole gamut of orientations, briefly 
listing no fewer than thirty-six schools (or "sub"- schools) 
of thought, from the allegorical, case method, and authori­
tative revelational approaches of Plato, Aristotle, and 
St. Thomas Acquinas (respectively), to the misodemic, 
normativist and universalist orientations of the more 
contemporary analysts.
What is particularly important to note here however, 
is that at least sixteen of the twenty-six "methodologies" 
most frequently inhabit the domain of the "behavioural 
approach" in one form or another (e.g. the approaches of 
decision-making, the mathematical and metrical, the empirical, 
the structural-functional, the systems, the eclectic, the 
interdisciplinary, the residence-of-power, etc., etc.,).
Consequently, the redundance and overlapping of 
approaches and schools in Charlesworth's listing fails 
to provide one with a meaningful systematization by which 
one can pin-point his own approach without running in circles.
In my mind, in describing any "methodology" or "approach",
I feel it is best to distinguish between the unit (or 
units) of analysis which comprise(s) the theoretical 
substance of the approach on one hand, and the actual 
treatment of raw material (data, norms, or whatever) on
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8the other. Quite clearly, both are "sine-qua-nons" of 
the epistemological base of a complete approach, and are
in fact more rewarding than Charlesworth's categorization.
A very enlightening classification based upon this premise 
is provided by Don Hartindale.p Although Martindale is 
primarily concerned with "functionalism", he develops it 
in a rigorous, contextual setting, relating it to the other 
major contemporary schools of thought.
With regard to the uhit(s) of analysis of an approach,
Martindale distinguishes between those that are "holistic" 
(i.e. concerned with the totality of the environment 
within which the phenomenon occurs, such as "system") and 
those that are "elementary" (i.e. concerned with the smallest 
possible basic element of the phenomenon, such as the 
"individual"). Quite clearly, there may be a plurality of 
units of analysis as I will demonstrate later. In fact one 
of Heinz Ehlau's most enlightening contributions has been 
the finding that there must necessarily be at least two 
units of analysis: a theoretical unit (such as a "group",
SvA"nation", or a "system") which provides the scope and 
focal point of the enquiry and which comprises the conceptual 
scheme or "model", and an "empirical" unit of analysis 
(such as the individual man) which provides the focal point 
of observation and raw material gathering.^ In carrying
2. Don Martindale, "Functionalism in the Social Sciences"
in American Academy of Political and Social Science, 
(Monograpn no. 5, 15657»
3. Heinz Sulau, in Charlesworth, op. cit., p. 36.
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9this analysis one step further, it is quite clear to see 
that the former represents what is termed "macro-theory" 
and the latter, "micro-theory".
Martindale*s framework also distinguishes between a 
"positivist" treatment of data (following the methods of 
the natural and physical sciences) and an "anti-positivistic" 
systematization. The most significant forms of "anti- 
positivistic" data treatment have been the "normativist", 
the "formalist", the "existentialist" and the "sociological" 
orientations.
Martindale ultimately arrives at a categorical frame­
work which comprises a systematic combination of these 
concepts. The "positivistic elementarism" would be best
represented by the "behaviourists" (not to be confused with 
"behaviouralist"), a school of thought conceived Ly 
psychologist J. B. Watson and carried on presently by such 
notables as B. M. Maclver, F. S. Chapin, and Irving Coffman. 
The combination of a "positivistic" treatment of data and a 
"holistic" theory analysis however, is representative of 
such approaches as Marxism (as perpetuated by Ralph 
Dahrendorf) and "Positive Organicism" (G. B. Void). "Anti- 
positivistic holism", indicating a concern for a non-rigorous 
and sociological explanation of larger wholes, is presently 
dominated by the "sociological functionalists" such as 
Talcott Parsons, Robert K. Merton, and the work of C. Wright 
Mills. It is this group which is most often considered to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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be the leaders of the "behavioural" trend (defined below)*
The fourth combination, that of "anti-positivistic elementarism", 
is currently represented by such schools as the "Neo-Kantian 
Formalists" (Werner Stark), the "Phenomenological Sociolo­
gists" (G. Gorvitch) and the "Existential Sociologists"
(Karl Jaspers). Heedless to say, one could also further 
subdivide these schools by introducing the terras "micro" 
and "macro", e.g. Parsons and Merton could be considered as 
"macro-functionalists", and Kurt Lewin and the Gestaltist 
group as "micro-functionalists".
Robert Brown, although not as systematically or in 
nearly the same depth, distinguishes between seven 
"theoretical devices" (combining both holistic and elementary 
units of analysis) in juxtaposition with varying forms of 
data treatment.4 This type of division with regard to 
approaches of study of political phenomena seems to be the 
most widely recognized as well as the most comparatively 
relevant.
I would now like to narrow down the generalizations 
concerning different orientations to political study by 
focusing more directly upon the approach labelled as 
"behaviouralism", which encompasses the model which I have 
employed in this paper. Following the framework above,
4. Robert R. Brown, Explanation in the Social Sciences, 
(Chicago, 19637.
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the "behavioural" approach can be subdivided into theory 
(units of analysis) and data treatment. What is most 
unique among the behaviouralists is their common committment 
to a "scientific" treatment of data regardless of the 
theoretical conceptual scheme employed. With regard to 
the latter however, there are as many "behaviouralisms" 
as there are different combinations of theoretical units 
of analysis. This necessarily gives rise to perpetual 
subdivisions within the behavioural school corresponding 
to the holistic-elementarist, positivistic - anti-positivistic, 
and macro-micro classifications described above.
The theory of "behaviouralism" is rooted in the prospects 
of finding a science of general social behaviour which 
would be modeled after the methodological (data treatment) 
assumptions of the natural sciences. However, apart from 
their common dedication to scientific treatment, behaviour- 
alists have split on the search for the requisite, universal, 
"fundamental units" or common variables of theoretical 
analysis relating to human behaviour which would allow them 
to make adequate generalizations or "laws" regarding social 
activity. It is in the latter respect that behaviouralists 
have appeared disunited and confusing to the critical 
observer. "Behaviouralism" can thus be restated at this point 
as the scientific method (of data treatment) combined 
with a shift in emphasis to the substantive, qualitative 
aspects of theory construction (i.e. units of analysis).
It is clear that the more specific, methodological, and 
scientific asoects of the current behaviouralist movement
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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began in the 1920's; however, the uniquely "behavioural"
qualities: of the movement, the theoretical aspects, did not 
begin to catch up to the quantitative methodology until the 
raid - 1950's, thus accounting for the currently erroneous
preoccupation of some viewers with the rigorous "behaviour- 
istic" and quantitative aspects of behaviouralism.
Until the 1940's, Harold Lasswell carried the burden 
of integrating behavioural theory with scientific empirical 
research. Now the theoretical applications are many and 
varied. David Easton is no doubt the leader of macro­
analysis in the behavioural field, specializing in the 
society-wide integrative "system" as the theoretical unit 
of analysis.5 David Apter is most well known for his 
"structural" orientation of behaviouralism.g Karl W.
Deutshh has focused upon Gommunication relationships as 
the theoretical glue of political behaviour,y while Harry 
Eckstein has adopted "authority patterns" as the key 
conceptual framework.g D. B. Truman's excellent treatment 
of the "group" as the prime theoretical unit of analysis
5. Eastona work in this field is covered by too many 
publications to note here;: the bibliography lists 
what are perhaps the most representative of the
selection.
6. see D* Apter, The Politics of Modernization, (Chicago, 
1965), especially pi IS 77., allhougE I do not agree 
completely with his distinction between the "structural 
approach" and "behavioural approach".
7. see especially Deutch, The Nerves of Government,
(New York, 1965). "
8. The best and most concise treatment of this concept is
given in Eckstein's Division and Cohesion in Democracy, 
especially chapters T, TT7T~and~XTI7
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has been particularly influential on sociological interpre­
tations.^ Max Weber and Talcott Parsons have conducted 
profound behavioural studies employing the concept of "action" 
as the theoretical cement of the epistemology of political 
behaviour.2Q No less ambitious have been the multi-focal 
unit attempts of Gabriel A. Almond, Sydney Verba, Lucian Pye,
G. Bingham Powell, Jr., and James S. Coleman to weave together 
the theoretical constructs of "system", "culture", "function", 
"structure", and "action" into a conceptual scheme for 
comparative analysis and development r e s e a r c h . P e r h a p s  
the most widely used and accredited theoretical and empirical 
unit of analysis today however is that of the decision 
making structure. This behavioural focal point is particularly 
prevalent in community studies (James Coleman), international 
relations and game theories (Morton Kaplan), and voting 
behaviour (Paul Lazarsfeld.)p2
Anthony Downs presents a decision making theory of 
analysis which I feel is particularly applicable to the 
East European communist environment and hence have employed
9. see D. B. Truman, The Governmental Process, (New York,
10. Fbr the most concise and clear account of Parsons'
"action theory", see Societies: Evolutionary and
Comparative Perspectives, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 
Prentice-Rall; I966), especially pp. 5 - 9 and pp. 28 - 35.
11. There are several good works by these theorists 
concerning the multi-unit approach; the more pertinent 
ones are listed in the bibliography.
12. see especially Coleman's monograph Community Conflict 
(New York, Free Press, 195?); Paul Lazarsfeld (et. âT.)
The People's Choice, (New York, Columbia, 1948); and
Morion""A. Kaplan^s^System and Process in International
Politics, (New York% WTley, I5577T especially pp. To5~’-244,
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it as the theoretical rationale for the model presented
in this paper. It is a comprehensive, socio-psychological 
theory which focuses upon the concept of the "economic 
rationality" of political actors, but yet is sufficiently 
flexible to allow for its own integration with the structural 
aspects of society as presented by the functional model.
In section "C" I will present the reasoning background 
for this choice. In the intervening section, I will 
proceed to clarify and concretize the prerequisite concepts 
of "behaviouralism", "functionalism" and "model" as I will 
be employing them in this paper.
B. THE FORM OF THE MODEL
Due to the abundance of constructs and theories 
available the scientist has acquired the additional problem 
of choice. A wrong choice of "tools" may not only result 
in the lack of any positive contribution to the science of 
politics but may even result in the"loss of ground" by 
adding new problems, or at least confusion, to the area. 
Conversely, a proper choice, one which is both quantitatively 
and qualitatively consistent with the particular dilemma 
which the scientist is to encounter, can be just as rewarding 
as the improper choice is penalizing.
The subject of study in this text is the communist 
governments of East Europe. The comparative approach has
been chosen for several reasons. Quantitatively, the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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plurality of the Eastern European governments alone justifies 
some need, for comparison! Although there is sufficient 
political commoness between them to speak of all of them 
generally as having certain attributes, tendencies, and so 
forth, they are in another respect like fingerprints; 
although superficially the same at a glance, there are 
many significant differences which can be detected and put 
into focus only by the comparative microscope. Qualitatively 
the difference between the political processes of these 
governments can best be perceived horizontally, comparing 
basically similar "layers" of political activity existent 
within each country's political process. A "vertical" 
comparison alone, compartimentalized country by country, 
inevitably fails to be sufficiently analytically significant, 
considering the intricacies of the modern phenomena.
My aim will be to show in the clearest possible terms, 
the contemporary "de facto" workings of the overall political 
systems of the communist East European communities. Our 
starting point will be with the "theory of the general 
model", indicative and explanatory of the basic system 
similarities between these countries. To a certain degree, 
it is intended to explain not only the basics of the systems 
of government in communist East Europe, but of any contemporary 
communist regime. As will be outlined in the discussion of 
the "general model", there will also be some predictive 
value of the theory, in addition to the descriptive and 
explanatory benefits. This will perhaps be of considerable
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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merit as a basis of determining actual political decisio&s 
to be taken by these countries in the future. More will 
be said on this point in the concluding chapters. The 
selection of the horizontal-comparative approach however, 
only gives one some direction, some general alignment 
between the starting point and the target. There are many 
possible roads by which one may venture in that direction 
and more importantly perhaps, there are several types of 
"vehicles" by which one may travel. Thus there are equally 
crucial procedural choices availabèè and decisions to be 
made, all of which will have a direct effect upon the 
validity and usefullness of the analysis to be rendered 
and conclusions to be drawn..In other words, our inves­
tigation will necessarily be circumscribed by the choice 
of the new (and old) techniques, theories, approaches, and 
methodologies applied.
The general approach being comparative, the particular 
"path" or precise methodology will be decidedly "behavioural" 
In addition, the "vehicle" chosen will be that of the 
"functional model". Altogether therefore, I will present 
the analytical content in the form of the"general systems 
theory" with a "behavioural" treatment of evidence.
As I have indicated in the previous section, the 
behavioural movement is gaining unprecedented currency in 
every social science field. Due to the exemplary post-war 
developments mentioned earlier, the activity of politics
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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around the world has undergone phenomenal change while 
the academic equipment of the political scientists has 
remained relatively static. Consequently, the post-war 
years have witnessed some widening of the gap between the 
rapidly changing dynamics of political behaviour on 
every continent and the sluggish response of the orthodox 
political means to accomodate it.
The conventional political science has consisted 
essentially of the following characteristics:
1) a legalistic orientation; a study of formal, legal 
structures, offices, and institutions;
2) a stress upon what "ought to be" rather than 
what "is";
3) a normative approach, professing primarily (moral) 
value judgements;
4) a pre-ocdupation with "offices'* and "authorities"; 
generally, a "compartimentalized" approach;
5) a stress upon "group" activity, eg. cabinet, 
legislature, etc., rather than individual activity.
The post-war development in political science, 
culminating in the contemporary approach, contrasts the 
pre-war "science" with the following corresponding ideas:
1) an emphasis upon informal political structures
(such as pressure groups, religious associations, 
etc.) in addition to the formal political structure;
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2) a "de facto" orientation; what "is" the actual 
political activity and how does the activity 
manifest itself with relation to how it insti­
tutionally "should";
5) it attempts to be dispassionate, non-normative; 
no idealistic solutions;
4) it tends to become more multi-dimensional, adding 
to the political dimension such disciplines as 
economics, sociology, psychology, and anthropology;
5) it focuses upon individual activity (eg. of leaders), 
as well as groups, whether formal or informal.
In addition to these basic orientations, David Easton 
most cogently provides the contemporary scientist with the 
more concrete assumptions and objectives of the behavioural 
movement. "Behaviouralism" assumes that political behaviour 
provides the empirical scientist with regularities suffic- 
iently generalizeable to have meaningful explanatory and 
predictive results. Therefore verification of hypotheses 
by relevant human behaviour is a requisite goal. Data 
techniques, regardless of specific choice, must be structured 
congruently with the problem, and not simply a haphazard 
treatment of raw data. Consequently, quantification has 
no value "per se", but only where it is instrumental as an 
aid to understanding and prediction. Ethical evaluations 
and moral judgements should be clearly separated from
Ip7 see ' Ï3  las tori, "ïhe Current Meaning of ’Behaviouralism’"
in Gharlesworth, (ed.), op. cit., pp. 11 - $1.
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academic and empirical value considerations. Understanding 
and explanations of the political phenomena considered 
must precede all applications of theory toward solutions 
to "de facto" social problems..Theory and scientific 
research must be systematically combined, and not randomly 
jungled, to be behaviourally relevant. Finally, there 
must be no "a priori" restrictions or impediments to inter­
disciplinary integration; social science, whether political 
or other, deals with the whole human situation and cannot 
ignore the relevant findings of other disciplines.
The above syndrome of tendencies, assumptions and 
objectives best summarizes the concept of "behaviouralism" 
which I intend to employ. The basic idea is that behav­
iouralism, both as a philosophic movement and a practical 
methodology, is more than just what many of its critics 
pretend, viz. a polite name to disguise the act of re- 
introducing the blatant rigors of the quantitative, 
mathematical scientism through the back door. Although 
its form employs the scientific method (with the limitations 
mentioned above) the approach derives the essence of its 
"behaviouralness" from the theoretical search for stable 
units for understanding human behaviour, e*g, in its 
political aspects.
This then raises the question of the limitations of 
behaviouralism. There is such a vast amount of literature 
concerning the "pros" and "cons" of this approach that there
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is neither adequate time.nor real purpose to enter into 
this terrain here, which is quite another thesis. I shall 
therefore leave the detailed battle to such apologists as 
Arnold Brecht, Harold Lasswell and Heinz lulau (for the 
affirmative) and Dwight Waldo and Leo Strauss (for the 
negative),
I do feel compelled however, in order to substantiate 
the model 1 have chosen, to provide a limited defence as 
well as make clear to the reader certain important caveats 
of behaviouralism. As I have previously demonstrated, there 
are necessarily two levels of analysis with which the 
behavioural scientist must contend: the theoretical,
conceptual unit or scheme (eg. the "system"), and the 
empirical unit, the source of raw data. The key to success 
for this approach is to master the need to link behaviourally 
relevant (political) theory with the theoretically relevant 
behavioural data. Where complex phenomena are involved, 
complete success is hard to come Quite clearly,
ultimate success in this regard is a function of the pro­
gressive development of scientific techniques and the 
increasing skills of the behavioural investigators.
Due to initial failures, polemicists have further
accused behaviouralists of being intellectually stubborn 
for their failure to revert to the traditional, historical, 
legal and normative approaches. It is true that the more 
conventional orientations seem to be here to stay, but it
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is my belief that the evidence suggests that one should not 
remain solely with the analysis of the past, especially 
since these older concepts are becoming increasingly 
outdistanced by reality. If today's social "science" 
is ever to catch up with the complexities of modern phenomena, 
the only way in my mind is through fresh, realistic exper- 
imentation. While it is admitted that there is still 
substantial value in a limited application of conventional 
methods, such value will only decrease if the traditional 
approaches insist on remaining isolated from the necessary 
integration with the knowledge of other disciplines and 
the fruits of the experimentation in a changed society.
Innevitably there arises the normativist concern for 
the "value limitation" of the behavioural method. And it is 
a viable argument in the sense that the behavioural persuasion 
does not and cannot deal, scientifically or otherwise, with 
ultimate, moral, primary value considerations. The distinction, 
quite clearly, rests between moral judgements on the 
one hand, and academic or cognitive ones on the other.
Moral considerations such as "should variable 'x' have 
greater power over the political system?", or "why is 
democracy better than dictatorship?", or "should man be 
able to control political phenomena?" all have no place in 
behavioural science; these matters are for philosophers, 
not scientists. Behaviouralism, because it does employ 
the scientific methodology, can only concern itself with 
the secondary, "if...then" judgements. If the behaviouralist
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can control the "if" situation (i.e. create the circumstances 
necessary to make the "if" come true), then he can scientif­
ically predict the resulting "then". The fact that the 
benefits of behavioural science do not include moral and 
ethical Judgements does imat :ui nyr miu^ depreciate the 
value of the approach, but rather only proves that behav- 
iouralists are neither divine philosophers nor social 
magicians.
A more serious limitation of behaviouralism rests 
with the need for the integration of both "micro" and 
"macro" levels of analysis. As noted earlier, behavioural 
scientists tend to specialize in one or the other. Certainly 
the behavioural methodology would be seriously suspect if 
the micro-theories of Paul &azarsfeld (decision-making 
and voting studies), D. B. Truman ("group" analysis) and 
Morton Kaplan (decision-making and game theory) conflicted 
with or at least could not be reconciled with the macro- 
behavioural products of David Easton, Gabriel Almond 
and Harry Eckstein (general systems theory). Obviously, 
for all political phenomena to be favourably susceptible 
to the behavioural approach, there must be reasonable 
and satisfactory relationships linking "micro" and "macro" 
analysis. The behavioural scientist must be able to establish 
a coherent bridging network between the individual, the group, 
the nation and the system.
Quite clearly, this problem has not yet been solved;
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there has not yet been enough sophisticated research 
within any one of these theoretical-unit fields, let 
alone between them all. However, advances are clearly being 
made as more inhovative hypotheses and integrations are 
tested, and the trend indicates that, notwithstanding a 
high casualty rgte, the century will witness the uncont­
ested superiority of the behavioural methods of social 
investigation.
Yet 1 am convinced that this is the best methodology 
currently available for the purposes of my study here, 
namely, to explain as simply and realistically as possible 
the "de facto" political decision making activity with 
regard to the East European communist governments. 
Considering the political phenomena to be studied here, 
the approach to any treatment of them as they exist in a 
communist state must almost of necessity be behavioural,
A non-behavioural (eg. institutional) study of communist 
society would obviously lead the investigator astray —  
analysing power institutions where no power exists, passing 
out liberties to individuals and groups which do not in 
fact have them, and occupying himself with legal frame­
works which are but facades, masking the realities of 
power. There is too large a gap between the "legalities" 
and the "actualities" in the communist state to employ 
any method but a behavioural one. The non-behavioural 
methods would at least in part maintain the legal facade.
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What is required for a "de facto" study of the communist 
political processes is, quite clearly, a "de facto" 
methodology, and the behavioural approach is the best 
weapon of attack in the arsenal of the contemporary
political scientist.
It should be noted however, that the behavioural 
approach, as I perceive it to be and also as I employ 
it here, is not, nor should not be exclusive of the 
conventional tools and methods of analysing political 
science but rather inclusive of them, selecting the best 
aspects from each, either singly or in combination, as the 
analysis warrants. The acceptance of the behavioural 
methodology does not imply an outright rejection of conven­
tional methods, but rather only that the more orthodox 
procedures are inadequate in themselves and require 
supplementation by a more realistically productive tech­
nology of analysis.
Yet the "behavioural methodology" is just what it says- 
a methodology —  a means of treating data. As noted pre­
viously, this alone cannot satisfy the purpose since this 
would only produce a rather awkward accumulation of inform­
ation. The data say nothing by themselves and there is 
certainly no magic in the method of their collection.
The factual information must be accounted for meaningfully 
by some theoretical construct, otherwise there is no
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particular significance attached to the data, they just
"hang in the air". There can be no inductive generalization 
made, no explanation given, nor any logical deductive reas- 
oning promulgated by the data, until they have been given 
substantial weight and analytical value by some theoretical 
construct. But once the theoretical element is added, such 
possibilities will then exist and the validity and usefullness 
of the theoretical structure will be determined on its 
merits by further testing, correcting and predicting.
Of the many theoretical approaches available to the 
contemporary political scientist, the one which I have 
chosen to accomplish the above tasks in marriage with the 
behavioural approach is that of "functionalism". "Function­
alism" (alias "structural functional analysis", "systems 
analysis", "general systems theory") has its origins 
primarily in sociology and anthropology, being associated 
with such names as Emile Durkheim, A. R. Radcliffe - Brown 
and Bronislaw Malinowski. It has more recently been adopted 
by other social sciences, most notably psychology and 
political science.
Of the many "functionalists" practicing within the 
political domain, Don Martindale provides what is perhaps 
the most concise yet coherent work on the theory of 
"functionalism".14 Technically, he distinguishes between
14, Don Martindale, op. cit,
253964
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three types of functionalism in the social sciences. Of 
least significance is "eclectic" functionalism which 
finds in the term simply another and equally relevant dimen- 
sion to add to all of the others (power, authority, etc.), 
the addition of which brings the science a little closer 
to reality; the nature of "function" in this regard is 
understood to mean simply "purpose" or "objective".
Secondly, there exists an "empirical functionalism" which, 
although still regarding function as "purpose", considers 
this dimension to be substantially more important than, 
and central to, all other units of analysis. Thirdly, 
there is the prevailing concept of "structural functionalism" 
which is the sense in which I employ it here. "Structural 
functionalism" places emphasis on the whole system as the 
theoretical unit of analysis and thus becomes equated with 
"general systems theory". It is holistic in scope and 
organicist and non-positivistic in its application based 
upon the premise of establishing a whole new scientific 
theory of politics. Although I do not claim this 
magnitude of success with its application in this paper,
I believe that such an achievement is well within the 
realm of probability in future decades.
The best definition of (structural) functionalism
(or systems theory) is that provided by Norton Kaplan
"...the study of a set of interrelated 
variables, as distinguished from the 
environment of the set, and of the ways 
in which the set is maintained under 
the impact of environmental disturbances...
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emphasizing ...the articulation of the 
system of its components and the 
behaviours by means of which it maintains 
itself over time.M^s
This concept of functionalism clearly demonstrates the 
application of specific environmental and multi-disciplinary 
integration together with certain emphasis on sociological 
theory.
Since the subject of my own theoretical analysis here 
will be the scope of the national political system 
within each of the countries of communist East Europe 
(and among all of them generally), the notion of "system" 
as given by this definitional treatment is essential. The 
inclusion of the idea of interdependence between variables 
is also requisite to the analysis since I feel that the 
behavioural data supports this concept. Yet I wish to make 
it clear at the outset that although I intend to substantiate 
certain basic linkage between variables in the system 
through their behavioural interdependence, this does not mean 
that every variable within the system must necessarily 
exist in a cause - and - effect relationship with every 
other variable. I see no reason why this claim is especially 
pertinent to the analysis or even should be made.
As a form of general behavioural theory, (structural) 
functionalism encounters much of the same critical difficulty
15. Morton A. Kaplan, "Systems Theory", in Gharlesworth, 
op. cit., p. 150.
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discussed above. The major problems with its application 
rest with the functionalist's apparent failure to specify 
and elaborate the precise nature of the interdependence 
of particular variables as well as being unable to 
adequately relate data on the empirical level to their 
corresponding referents on the theoretical or "system" 
level. Quite clearly, as before, these difficulties will 
only disappear in proportion to the advancement of behavioural 
technology and skills.
More seriously perhaps is the shortcoming that is 
difficult to determine precisely when a system is being 
satisfactorily (or unsatisfactorily) maintained. What are 
the objective, empirical criteria? Needless to say, the 
first part of this problem smacks of moral considerations 
and therefore is excluded from the behaviouralist scope.
Once this normative difficulty is solved however, the 
empirical criteria must be found, otherwise the usefulness 
of the theory and the control over the system will be lost.
I can only say that if such indicators are not obvious 
(and I think they are in the model which I present), 
then further behavioural experimentation will be necessary, 
perhaps employing theoretical units other than "system".
In contrast to these limitations which I feel are in 
no event insuperable, the rewards of the functional approach 
are substantially more apparent. In studying the phenomena 
of such a complex contemporary society, the systems
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approach sensitizes our analysis to the relevant and intricate
interrelationships and dynamics of modern social behaviour.
It draws attention to the whole social system as a setting 
for political phenomena and thereby forces consideration 
of the products and techniques of other disciplines, in 
addition to the new theoretical dimensions of "funcbion", 
"activity? and "purposes" (whether of the "latent" or 
"manifest" variety as theorized by R. K. Merton).1$
More significantly still, the structural functional 
construct together with the behavioural methodology, 
has provided modern theorists with a fresh and infinitely 
flexible framework for political analysis which could 
conceivably account for and systematize every problematically 
important political behaviour from that of the smallest 
variable to that of the entire system. At the moment 
however, it is empirically impossible to test most of the 
phenomena by such a holistic and non-positivistic approach. 
This is the type of difficulty that both Parsons and Almond 
have encountered; they have attempted, by adopting an over- 
ambitious set of conceptual units, to theorize about too 
many phenomena ab too many different levels of analysis 
simultaneously, without having an equally sophisticated 
reservoir of techniques and skills at their disposal with 
which to treat and meaningfully integrate all of the data 
to verify their hypotheses. Nevertheless, the progressive
16. see Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure , 
(Rev. edit.), (Glencoe^ 199777 especially~pp.~'SÜ~-“S2,
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"tools" indicates that even more complete and testable 
analyses are imminent.
Having now established the basis for the application 
of both "behaviouralism" and "functionalism", something 
must be said of the concept of "model".
The synthesis which I have created by the integration 
of "behaviouralism" and "functionalism" is what may be 
termed the "behavioural systems model". The term "model" is 
in essence a "theory" or an "hypothesis". But it is not 
just a theory; it is a theoretical construct —  an aggregation 
formulation, and integration of a set of ideas in such 
a manner that together, in that particular pattern or 
construct, they best explain what is intended to be investigated. 
Therefore it is not simply a collection of ideas; a model 
derives its "modelness" from the pattern or purposeful 
integration and interrelationship of those ideas.
The more explicit purpose for the behavioural model 
is best stated by Aviery Leisersoniiy
"For the normative theorist, it is 
essential to establish satisfactory 
purposive grounds on which sufficient 
unity exists for the system to be 
worth maintaining; for the empirical 
theorist, it is necessary to explicate 
a working model of political mechanics 
or dynamics, whereby conflicting factual
17. Aviery Leiserson, "Empirical Approaches to Democratic
theory", in 0. Garceau, Political Research and Political 
Theory, (Cambridge, 19687, p7"'2D. ~ “
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requirements of constitutional belief 
and social structure are reconciled in 
a logically adequate explanation of 
how... the political system... 
survives as an effective political 
enterprise."
Thus the "model" is essentially an explanatory 
device which entails a patterning of variables and their 
more or less logical relationships. Also implied are 
certain rules of interaction which, when the variables 
are assigned given values (either quantitative or quali- 
tative), the phenomenon under consideration would logically 
result. The theoretical model is therefore the spring- 
board to "scientization" and the resulting predictive 
rewards. The validity and usefulness of the "model" for 
purposes of understanding and control of political behaviour 
will necessarily be a function of how accurately the 
model variables correspond to the political realities; the 
better the structural-functional "fit", the more precise and 
innovative the predictive results will be.
The model may well take a diagramatic form (as it 
will here) in addition to the abstract-verbal form. In 
the diagramatic model, each variable or element in the 
visual conceptualization will have a clearly discernible 
referent on the empirical level, thus interlocking the 
research with the theory and providing a basis for 
behavioural verification, step by step. The comparative 
relationships which will be under inquiry can best be
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illustrated by a series of graphic models which represent 
a microcosm of the workings of the political decision 
making process in communist East Europe.
The model, both verbally and diagramatically, can 
also be termed "interactive" (rather than "static") since 
it is based upon the notion of functional interdependence 
which carries with it the idea that the action of one 
variable leads to the reaction or response by another.
It is this notion of "dynamic response" a "sine qua non" 
of the model, which I intend to show is indicative of the 
actual process of political decision making in the countries 
concerned.
Furthermore, I intend to show that the decision making 
process under investigation is of a circular nature, and 
that the process is continuous in the form of successive 
"rounds" of decision making activity, each "round" consisting 
of identifiable action and reaction within the environment 
to political decisions being made in response to pressure 
and alternatives both within and without the political 
structure. Yet each "round" is itself a response to the 
previous round, and the variables fluctuate accordingly.
Hence in addition to the basic model outlining the "usual" 
pattern of activity in each round of decision making, 
there will be model variations explaining the trans­
ition of the decision making process occasioned by the
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fluctuation of variables in successive rounds. In effect, 
the presentation will not be of the "static" two dimensional 
type, but rather of the "dynamic" three dimensional variety. 
Obviously, for explanatory purposes, the latter is much 
more complete in form, and, 1 hope, in substance as well.
It should be remembered that this form of "dynamism" is 
inherent in the concept of "functionalism" which I have 
employed. As Kaplan has illustrated (supra), functionalism 
of the structural variety entails the maintenance of the 
system variables "over a period of time". As such, the 
functional model, by its very nature, is especially 
adaptive to and fruitful for comparative, dynamic analysis.
The model 1 have derived is the outcome of finding a 
balance between two most important values in this type of 
research, namely, simplicity and sophistication. Needless 
to say, a simple model is more easily communicable than a 
complex one; it also makes the behavioural task of selecting 
and applying empirical evidence much less difficult. Yet 
it has the insurmountable drawback that it can rarely tell 
us significant, new information of more complex political 
phenomena. On the other hand, a much more sophisticated 
model which has a much greater potential for profound 
innovations can rarely be practical or manageable for veri­
fying its conclusions. Consequently as in most things 
political, a compromise must be struck between the two 
extremes. For the purpose of the comparative investigation 
at hand, 1 believe that the model which is presented represents
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anarchic confusion of the most comprehensive variety of 
system, while simultaneously containing adequate sophis­
tication to first of all explain more clearly and in a 
more meaningful context, what we already know of the 
communist systems of last Europe, and secondly, give some 
new insights into the workings of their decision making 
mechanisms. In addition, I feel that every important 
variable and definitional treatment is behaviourally 
verifiable, and assumptions are minimized to those which 
the discipline rarely challenges. It is sincerely hoped 
that the model is sufficiently "air tight" to withstand 
the ever changing winds of political phenomena.
As is evident to the reader by now, the model, by 
virtue of the explanatory purposes for which it was 
derived, will adopt a "macro-functional" scope, covering 
each East European communist community at the national 
system level. The usual criticism of this scope is that it 
is too large and unwieldly, necessitating a research effort 
and verification scheme which is impossible with the present 
impreciseness of the tools of the discipline. Yet the 
model, for all its scope, has surprisingly few variables. 
This is not as inconsistent a development as at first may 
appear. Although the society-wide scope is the same, the 
model is limited to portraying only the variables necessary 
for the treatment of the national political decision making 
process; it is not a model explanatory of every phenomenon
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of East European political life, although it is expected 
that some light may be shed upon these others as well.
In other words, the model focuses upon only one major 
phenomenon —  the decision making element at the national 
level —  and those attached phenomena directly related to 
the process. As will be shown however, the verbal 
explanations will of necessity go into more detail, 
touching periodically upon other phenomena (eg. the socio­
logical and psychological rammifications in East European 
politics) which are less relevant to our specific analysis,
G. THE RATIONALE FOR THE MODEL
Although the theoretical unit of study and "scope"
of the model is the political decision making system at
the national level, the empirical (or "micro") unit
of analysis will be a form of decision making itself.
It is not rare that in political models such as this
that "decision making" is both part of the methodology
and the explanatory objective at the same time. Quite
clearly, as stated by Paul Driesing,ig
"All decisions...occur within a
decision structure of some sort,
but political decisions in
addition have the preservation
and improvement of decision structures
as their special subject matter."
18. Paul Driesing, Reason in Society..., (Urbana, 1962) P. 198.
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This concept coincides with David Easton's "politics" 
as "authoritative allocation of values" ( by decision 
making), however Easton does not distinguish between 
either public and private allocations or public and private 
values. Anthony Downs, in his decision making analysis of 
political phenomena also equates public and private decision 
making, as does Alfred Kuhn and Francis M. Bator. The 
significance of this union of public and private decision 
making is that it enlarges the arena of political activity 
while at the same time increasing the amount of observ­
able "political" (decisional) behaviour.
Another reason for the employment of this empirical 
unit of analysis is that the model most satisfactorily 
accomodates the decision making rationale which serves 
as a basic for the verbal explanation of the decision
making phenomena studied. A preview of this line of 
reasoning is warranted here before the introduction of 
the model itself.
The behavioural approach, as valuable as it is for 
our purposes of investigation, is primarily a means of 
accounting for descriptions and explanations of the 
"what", the "how" and the "when" of political activity 
in the most realistic terms; it is some times deficient 
however, in the analysis of the "why". Therefore the 
specific theoretical rationale which I have added to 
the basic behavioural system framework to assist in such 
explanations is that of the "economic rationale".
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primarily in the form put forth in Anthony Downs, An 
Economic Theory of Democracy.!a
The basic hypothesis of the economic rationale is 
that just as corporations know their goals (e.g. profit) 
and employ the most "reasonable" (efficient) means of 
achieving them, so do political actors, i.e. there are 
specific, conscious goals of individuals while in their 
roles as political actors and we can explain and to some 
extent predict their political activity to achieve them.
The individual political actor, whether citizen or 
ruler, necessarily entertains a hierarchy of preferences, 
desires, and objectives, in the rank order of their 
importance to him. Due to inherent selfish motivations 
innate in every human actor, he will act politically by 
selecting the political alternative which best satisfies 
his utility stream or hierarchy of preferences. Indeed, 
for those political actors which to a significant degree 
control the political activity of a state (e.g. chief 
executives, party leaders, etc.), the selfish desire 
to possess and perpetuate this power is an economic in- 
centive of its own. This is especially true in states 
where political power is concentrated in the hands of the 
very few.
19. Anthonv Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, 
(New iLrk, 19577:-------------------------------
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There are several important assumptions about this 
hypothesis which should be realized at the outset. First 
of all, the hypothesis assumes a consistent,, intelligible 
relationship between "goals" and "means". Secondly,
there is an assumption of rationality itself on the 
behalf of the political actor; (does he always attempt 
to choose the alternative which will maximize his return 
per unit of cost?) Thirdly, there is the assumption 
that all rational decision makers, individuals in every 
political capacity, exhibit the same qualities.
These assumptions certainly present theoretical 
problems to be solved (such as the obvious irrationality 
of some political activity). There is also the investigator's 
empirical problem of determining whether a decision taken 
by a political actor is "rational" or not. The actor 
is supposedly rational because he makes political decisions 
according to "benefit" and "utility" streams represented 
by the ordered alternative decisions open to him. All 
human political actors, because of the fact that they are 
human, are basically "selfish" and consequently will 
consistently order their priority of choices such that 
they will make the decision most beneficial for their 
own purposes, regardless of the utility or disutility 
involved for the society as a whole.
Downs does not satisfactorily eliminate the theo­
retical problems inherent in his model and must subsequently
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recognize its limitations. However, Downs' theory was 
applied to the Western democratic society. There is 
ample reason to suggest that the problems he encountered 
were primarily the by-products of the democratic process 
and not the theory. In other words, I find that the 
employment of the "economic rationale" is more justified 
and more easily verifiable when applied to the model 
of the communist decision making process. The latter 
application does not confront the investigator with such 
difficulties as Downs encountered, and correspondingly 
the rationale becomes much more valuable as an explanatory 
and predictive device.
The evidence in support of this employment is over- 
whelming. The economic rationale assumes a high correlation 
between goals and means. This is a much less imperfect 
assumption in a communist regime since the number of 
political actors is tremendously reduced (in the name of 
"democratic centralism"). For this same reason, the 
problem of irrationality (or "rational error") is 
minimized; there are only a handful of individuals making 
truly significant "rational" decisions at the national 
level. Furthermore, the relatively fewer decision makers 
in communist society are limited to policy decisions 
which coincide (or can be "interpreted" to coincide) 
with the much less flexible ideology to which the society 
is committed. Thus their scope of rational choice in 
decision making is automatically less than their
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democratic counterparts since the areas of utility streams 
are usually much more narrowly circumscribed by both ideol­
ogical committments and long term "plans". Resultingly, 
the economic rationale has a higher probability of greater 
explanatory and predictive strength in its communist 
application than when applied to Western democracy.
It should be asserted quite clearly however, that in
any event this is not a serious limitation since decision 
making theory makes no claim or demand for "rationality". 
The assumption of rationality of a decision making person 
or structure is an impossible one. The most that can be 
said is that leaders and decision makers have some priority 
of values (whether rational or not, or even conscious or 
not) and they make judgements in the light of their own 
reasoning of the circumstances and alternatives. "Game 
theory" must assume rational actors but "decision theory" 
does not. The latter is empirical theory only and prohib­
its the notion of value judgement which is inherent in
the premise of rationality.
This, in effect, is precisely why "decision theory" 
fits so well into the structural-functional model. To 
theorize about decisions and actions which structural 
variables may make rests not on the internal rationality 
of the decision making unit, but rather on the external 
examination and understanding of the environmental and 
social stimuli (i.e. the other variables in the system
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and environment) which cause such decisions and actions
to he taken. Quite clearly, as James Rosenau summarizes,go
"Processes located in the environment 
toward which officials direct their 
decisions are no less relevant than 
those which occur in their minds and 
interactions".
The "selfish interest" theme of the economic rationale 
is also streamlined in its application. Since there are 
drastically fewer political decision makers of any signif­
icance in the communist state, the impact of "selfish 
interests" upon political decision making is concentrated 
in a small minority. In effect, the behavioural ability 
bo trace, explain and predict is tremendously increased 
since the investigator may legitimately concentrate upon 
the handful of decision makers rather than attempt the 
insurmountable task; of achieving the same level of accuracy 
in a pluralistic system where authority for significant 
decision making is structured in a much more amorphous 
arrangement of "power pockets" which are for the most 
part qualitatively distinct from one another.
In the communist state, on the other hand, all significant 
decision making is effectively politically controlled and 
centralized in the vej^f highest organs of the authoritative 
structure. In addition, despite the nominal plurality of 
decision making organs in the communist society, the behavioural
20. James N. Rosenau, "Premises of Decision Making Theory", 
in Gharlesworth (ed.), op. cit., p. 209.
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investigator need still only concern himself with applying
the "rationale" to a handful of individuals since invariably 
there is a high degree of cross-membership in these organ­
izations and subsequent interlocking of positions. Thus 
there are both quantative and qualitative advantages to 
applying the "economic rationale" to the communist system, 
especially for the behavioural investigator since the phenomena 
involved in the decision making process can be covered 
with adequate scope and depth without creating unmanageable 
technical difficulties in assimilating and applying the 
necessary empirical data.
One may well posit however, that if, according to the 
"rationale", the political actor pursues his own selfish 
interests at the expense of society, this "rationale" 
cannot be applied to the communist state where, according 
to ideology, one pursues the interest of society at the 
expense of himself! But is this really true in the 
communist state? Certainly the communist political actors 
entertain at least a superficially different "selfishness" 
(since they cannot personally possess untold amounts of money, 
goods or other bourgeois accoutrements!) but they are still 
human beings, and still "social animals", and therefore 
still "selfish". The communist ideology is one which denies 
not the existence of selfishness, but rather the "free play" 
of this selfishness as manifested by a free, or Western 
democratic polity. The communist citizen is not free to 
be selfish, or at least not free to follow up any selfish
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inclinations. The communist citizen, in effect, has nothing 
to be truly and politically selfish about; he has surrendered 
this priviledge to the handful of real decision makers who 
make these decisions for him in order bhat the members of 
the proletariat do not "destroy" themselves by pursuing 
their selfish interests in a bourgeois fashion. Therefore 
the rational© is still applicable here.
I ftgl that this is sufficient evidence to warrant the 
assertion that the "economic rationale" is considerably more 
useful as an explanatory basis of political decision making 
in the communist society than in Western democracy. The 
precise weight of this analytical advantage can only be 
appreciated after a critical survey of the results obtainable 
from the application of the comparative model which now 
follows.
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PART II 
THE MODEL
A. THE COMPONENTS OF THE GENERAL MODEL
Any comparative approach in political analysis should 
commence at a point of basic ground common to all of the 
countries under consideration, such as the basic similarities 
between them with regard to the particular phenomena 
studied. This allows the subsequent investigation with 
regard to differences to proceed from as unbiased a point 
of departure as is possible, thus illuminating much more 
clearly the dissimilarities and variations in the political 
activity subject to analysis. The "general model" is 
constructed to present such a common point of departure, 
outlining the basic similarities generally inherent in 
the decision making process of the communist societies 
of Eastern Europe.
As pointed out in PART I, the "model" is based upon 
the theory of functionalism, with the scope of the "general 
system". Dynamic in form and comparative in purpose, it 
employs the rationale of the "economic theory" and the 
methodology of behaviouralisii in the treatment of data 
and analysis.
Since the functional model is essentially an explana­
tory device, it is imperative that the mechanics of the 
model maintain the three necessary properties for any
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functional explanation to be meaningful. These properties 
are ;
1) a specific political phenomenon, or event;
2) a delineation of the "system" within which the 
event takes place (i.e. the boundaries);
5) and the resulting effects upon the variables 
within the system after the event has occurred.
With these properties in mind I will now begin to 
set up the model. At this point I will also become more 
eclectic in approach, borrowing variables and ideas from 
some of the leading names in this line of political 
research, especially David Easton, Gabriel A. Almond, 
and Sidney Verba. Much of the terminology which has been 
used by the model builders will be restated in terms 
and applications which are felt to be more realistically 
applicable to the model here. In any case, although much 
of the material has been used in models before, the 
specific form of the integration of these materials and 
the explanatory devices accompanying them are born of 
entirely original concepts. This has had to be the case, 
since to my knowledge, there has been no functional- 
behavioural model devised to date which has had to cope 
specifically with the phenomena concerned in the political 
decision making process in the communist societies.
The "boundaries" of the system of political decision 
making in the model will necessarily be, at the outset.
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the national society, since the analysis will be society- 
wide and generalizable over the whole political system.
(Later in this section, the boundary will be enlarged to 
include the necessary international variables). Within 
the societal boundary there will be some form of political 
decision making process. This "process" in its simplest 
form will be termed the "input-output" concept as 
represented in Diagram 1.
The societal boundaries in the diagram are self-evident. 
The political system within those boundaries represents the 
mechanics involved in the operations of the political 
decision making process within the framework of the total 
environment. The political decision making structure is 
that organizational unit within the political system which 
has ultimate responsibility for decisions. This structure 
need not, as the empirical evidence will show, be the 
formal government machinery, nor need it be even more than 
one person, i.e. a dictator.
The input variable represents the combination of 
"demands" and "supports". "Demands" represent pressure 
LgKm the decision making structure to promulgate certain 
ideas as "outputs". Demands are thus those "wants" which 
exert enough pressure upon the system to force the decision 
making structure to consider them as potential outputs.
The "wants" with which the model is concerned here are 
those interests, desires, etc., which occur in the environment
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and which require some form of political action to give 
them the status of "demands". A "want" which cannot be 
or is not "politicized" (transformed into a "demand") 
remains simply a "frustrated want".
"Supports" represent the aggregate of actions, feelings, 
beliefs, and attitudes within the environment which pre­
dispose the environment to think, act, and feel beneficially 
towards the political decision making system, i.e. in ways 
which tend to preserve and promote the system as it exists.
In a sense, the sum total of supports represents the degree 
of "legitimacy" given to the system.
The "output" variable is simply the combination of 
both authoritative and associative decisions promulgated 
by the decision making structure. Outputs of the "authori- 
tative" variety are "direct action" statements, requiring 
and enforcing the need and obligation for some positive 
action (or non-action) on behalf of some or all members of 
the society. The failure to comply with the obligations 
imposed by authoritative outputs results in the imposition 
of penalties in the form of legal sanctions. Outputs of 
the "associative" variety on the other hand rarely have 
such characteristics. They usually take the form of 
general policy pronouncements which are designed to influence 
the "atmosphere" of the environment (e.g. to make the 
environment more receptive to the authoritative outputs
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and to generate a certain degree of support for the programs 
put forth). The most conspicuous type of associative 
output is that of the nature of "propaganda".
The distinction between authoritative and associative 
outputs is extremely important analytically. In a Western 
democratic polity, the associative decisions and pronouncements 
must of necessity precede the authoritative outputs —  
the society must be generally amenable to the rationale 
behind the authoritative output before they accept it as 
legitimate. If the decision making structure of the Western 
democratic state attempts to promulgate and enforce 
authoritative outputs (which legally bind the members of 
society) without receiving either the overt or covert consent 
of the environment, various elements within the environment 
will react with hostility such that the existence of the 
entire decision making process may be threatened.
In a communist state, although generally authoritative 
outputs are preceded and supported by associative statements, 
there are many significant occasions when the associative 
output, if it comes at all, is promulgated long after the 
more arbitrary authoritative output is given. This is 
particularly evident in those communist states where there 
is a strong "Stalinist" orientation toward decision making.
In fact, there is substantial behavioural evidence to 
support the contention that in many cases there is no
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associative output given at any time to justify or win 
environmental support for the authoritative decision 
taken.
In those communist states which are more "progressive" 
(Roumania), "independent" (Yugoslavia), or "liberal" 
(Czechoslovakia, January - August, 1968), the reverse trend 
is often the case, where nearly every authoritative 
decision is proceeded by or at least made to co-incide 
with, the associative output created to generate popular 
support within the environment.
In addition to enabling the investigator to classify 
outputs, the relationship between these two types of output 
is particularly crucial when investigating political 
activity with regard to "legitimacy" (especially whether the
resulting "supports" of the input variable are "legitimate" 
or "forced"), the feedback (and its resulting environmental 
effects upon the system), and identifying sources of the 
outputs themselves (e.g. whether they are occasioned by 
inputs from the environment, "withinputs" of the decision 
making structure, or "international inputs"). More will 
be said of these new factors as the model building progresses.
At the moment, the explanation of Diagram 1 will be 
complete with a brief discussion of the "feedback". The 
"feedback" variable represents the environmental response
Reproduced with permission ot the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
50
to the outputs of the decision making structure. If the 
outputs are "effective", i.e. if they satisfy the most 
pressing wants and demands, or at least make the environment 
perceive them to be satisfied (by successful associative 
outputs), then the proportion of supports to demands (in 
the input factor) will be relatively high, resulting in a 
high degree of legitimacy accorded to the system which in 
turn tends to preserve and give stability to the political 
decision making process. On the other hand, if outputs 
are not effective or at least not perceived to be, then the 
"feedback", or total environmental response, will produce a 
redistribution of the "demand" and "support" elements of 
the input variable resulting in an appropriate reduction 
in the level of supports and a simultaneous and proportionate 
increase in the level of wants and demands.
This overall process will be discussed at length and 
in more detail in the more sophisticated forms of the model 
which follow. The point I wish to make here however, is 
that the role of the "feedback" in the model is a crucial 
one. It is the "feedback" which gives the decision making 
process the characteristic circularity which was discussed 
in the previous section. In the model drawn however, the 
feedback arrow is simply a diagramatic device to portray 
this circularity. In reality, the outputs permeate some 
elements of the environment immediately upon their release 
from the decision making structure, in which case the
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feedback response begins immediately. Other elements in
the environment may not be affected by the outputs until 
much later (or even not at all) and thus not generate a 
feedback response affecting the input variable until a 
much later date (or not at all). Thus, analytically, there 
is no co-ordinated, homogeneous feedback response as the 
arrow may suggest. Behavioural evidence in all of the 
last European countries indicates that such response is 
inevitably diversified in time, origin, content, and strength, 
Thus the feedback mechanism operates as a type of clearing 
house, weighing, sifting, and counter-balancing these 
diversified responses to outputs in the environment, and 
presents a "net" demand - support combination which becomes 
the new input variable. There may be considerable dissatis­
faction with some authoritative outputs, however this may 
be counterbalanced or erased by a proportionate increase 
in supports due to the success of some associative outputs 
promulgated at the same time. The "net" effect in the 
environment will then be practically nil.
Before proceeding further to the more advanced model, 
a more detailed discussion of the decision making structure 
is warranted. Diagram 2. presents a close-up of the typical 
political decision making structure in the communist states 
of Eastern Europe. This structure has been previously 
defined as "that organizational unit within the system 
which has ultimate responsibility for outputs". The
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behavioural evidence put forth in the following chapters 
will significantly substantiate the contention that this
"structure" is almost invariably synonymous with the 
politburo of the communist party, or at least the core 
group of the most influential members in it* What is 
important to realize is that it is not the "structure" 
or the "politburo" itself which is important, but rather 
the influential members which comprise it. Perhaps the most 
striking differences between the communist political system 
and that of the Western democracy is that in the former, 
decision making power is invested (at least "de facto") 
in men, not offices. Consequently, for the purpose of 
the model, political power follows the man, not the structure, 
no matter how formal or legal the latter may be. Therefore, 
although diagramatic convenience requires something which 
resembles an official structure, it must be realized that 
analytically this is not necessarily the case. Again, as 
behavioural evidence in the following chapters will 
indicate, the organizational unit represented by the 
"decision making structure" often is?in fact a small, 
informal group of men, usually dominated by one among 
them. The point is that the decision making power is 
derived from the personalities involved, not the organi- 
zational characteristics of the structure.
It is not my intention to give evidence on behalf of 
this hypothesis here but rather to point out two important
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features of the decision making structure in the model, as 
applied to the last European communist state. The first 
feature is the possible treatment of the "demands" of the 
input variable which are considered by the decision making 
structure as potential outputs. As "demand one" (Dl) 
indicates, a demand may be readily transformed into an 
output without significant modification. As an alternative, 
a number of demands may be grouped together (D 2, 5, 4,) 
and with some alteration eventually become an output factor. 
As D 5> 6, 7, 8, indicates however, a grouping of demands 
may take place in the form of a potential output and be 
pushed part way through the conversion process only to be 
killed before actually becoming an output, "D 9" represents 
the situation where a demand may be seriously considered 
however must be "split" for some reason or another, 
resulting in the formation of several potential outputs 
deriving from one demand. As in the previous case however, 
any number of these split demands may be "killed" before 
becoming an output. The previous discussion concerning 
"authoritative" outputs gives more theoretical credence 
to this type of activity, since different aspects of demand 
may be required to serve both authoritative and associative 
purposes. Finally, D 10, D 11, and D 12 are indicative of 
the situation where a number of single demands may be 
entertained for a period of time before being dropped (D 10), 
may be killed after some initial consideration (D 11), or 
simply ignored from the outset (D 12),
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The transformation of demands into outputs is self- 
explanatory with regard to demonstrating the circularity 
of which I spoke earlier. However, the "killing" of 
demands within the decision making structure seemingly 
contradicts the principle of the circular process and 
requires further discussion. If a demand (or demand 
"group") is terminated at this point, there may be no further 
concern with it by the decision making structure, which 
probably feels that a "non-output" of this nature would 
not have serious effects upon the environment. In this 
case the circularity for that particular input has ended and 
the "linkage" process has stopped. If the decision making 
structure is that which appears in the "Stalinist" type 
of state, then this structure may be more inclined to this 
type of response to demands (i.e. a "non-output response"), 
relying upon force to handle any serious environmental 
reaction to the "non-outputs". On the other hand, the 
more "liberal" type of regime which relies more heavily 
upon legitimate environmental support and avoids the use 
of force wherever possible, will tend to ignore only demands 
of minor consequence. In addition, the "liberal" decision 
making body will be more inclined to replace the ignored 
demand with one of its own, by creating an "associative" 
(propaganda) output to relieve the potential adverse 
environmental response to the "non-(authoritative) output". 
Thus if a demand is killed within a decision making structure, 
this need not represent a "non-influence" upon this group.
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In fact there is sufficient behavioural evidence in most 
all of Eastern European communist communities to support the 
hypothesis that if a sufficiently important demand from the 
environment is not to become an output (e.g. the demand 
for increased production and distribution of consumer 
goods), this "killed" potential output (authoritative) will 
be replaced by an associative output designed to compensate 
the environment for the non-satisfaction of its demand.
This brings me to the second important element to be 
discussed with regard to the decision making structure, 
the "withinput" factor ("W").
Since no decision making structure in any form of 
government, be it communist, democratic, or otherwise, can
satisfy all of the demands upon it, there will always be 
some form of "demand killing" such as the one described 
above. However, what is truly distinctive and unique to 
the totalitarian state is the tremendous significance of 
the "withinput" factor associated with "demand killing",
Â "withinput" is of essentially the same character as the 
"input", however it has its origins somewhere within the 
decision making structure itself. The "support" element 
however, can usually be taken for granted, since it can 
be assumed that the existing regime gives utmost support 
to itself and its system of decision making. Frequent 
purges within and without the decision making structure 
have the purpose of guaranteeing a satisfactory degree
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of homogeniety in this regard. Of more crucial analytical
value is the demand aspect of the withinput.
As noted earlier, many an authoritative output will 
be paralleled by an associative output to assist in its 
implementation. Host of the important authoritative outputs 
will necessarily be derived from withinputs (e.g. the long 
term "plans", "co-operatives", foreign policies, etc.), 
with relatively little regard given to the desires or 
influences of the environment. This, of course, is 
practically a definition of the totalitarian system of 
government and one of its basic features. Yet on the other 
hand, even the most totalitarian of states must give some 
recognition, albeit infrequent, imperfect, and indirect, 
to the environment, since this is in the best interests 
of the decision making group, namely to maintain and 
promote its own power. Consequently, "withinputs" will 
also result in associative outputs designed to assist in the 
proper administration of authoritative outputs (whether 
originating from inputs or withinputs), or to placate 
those dissatisfied elements of the environment which are 
subject to "non-outputs" as discussed above.
It should also be noted that the "withinput" demand 
is more often successful than the "input" demand in 
becoming an output, since it is originated by the decision 
making structure itself. It undoubtedly occurs however.
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that one or more members of the decision making group 
will have his own demands "killed" during this process.
The withinputs represented in Diagram 3 do not reflect 
this since for the purposes of the model at this stage, 
a perfectly homogeneous decision making group is assumed.gi
In summary then, by far the most important type of 
"demand" in the communist system is that of the "withinput" 
variety. It has a much better chance of being promulgated 
as an output, which is a noteable feature of "democratic 
centralism" in the communist decision making process.
In addition, it may well be a response to a "killed" 
demand from the environment, as well as being born solely 
within the decision making structure itself.
At this point, we are now ready to proceed with the 
more complex model.
B. THE DYNAMICS OP THE GENERAL MODEL - EQUILIBRIUM STATE
Diagram 3 represents the model approximating the 
"equilibrium" position. Although it may seem that the 
model is totally different than that of Diagram 1, the 
basic input - output principle is the same. Diagram 1,
21, Beginning with the non-equilibrium stage (Diagram 4(b)),
this assumption is no longer valid and demands arising
from the withinput variable are in fact "killed".
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in all of its simplicity, served the function of explaining 
the basic, circuitous principle involved in the decision 
making process. Diagram j? is a sophistication of that 
process which is intended to portray the more subtle 
characteristics of a particular type of decision making, 
that found in communist East Europe.
The societal boundary lines have been removed to 
avoid confusion; the reader must still assume that this 
model is of a national, society-wide decision making 
process. The decision making structure is identical to 
that just discussed (Diagram 2). The output factor 
however, takes on a new dimension here, becoming the 
"output area". This has been necessary in order to 
indicate variations in communist party initiative and 
control over the implementation of outputs. The larger 
the output area, the more extensive the party control, 
both quantitatively and qualitatively; the smaller the 
area, the more lax are the party controls at every level 
of the environment to be affected by the outputs concerned.
The feedback line is again simply a diagramatic device 
to demonstrate the interaction and linkage between outputs 
and inputs. Analytically, the output area covers the 
entire environment. Similarly, the "stress area" represents 
the entire environmental response to the output combination 
at that particular "round" of decision making activity.
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In effect, it represents the result of the feedback^
"clearing house" operations discussed earlier. The
"stress area" (or "environmental pressure area") reflects 
the correlation between "potential demands" and "supports"; 
the greater the level of"supports" compared to the level 
of "potential demands" (i.e. "wants"), the smaller the 
stress factor will be; conversely, the greater the level of 
potential demands as compared to the level of supports, 
the larger the "stress area" will be.
At this point, a new distinction must be made. Behavioural 
research necessitates a restatement of "demands" within the 
environment, which hitherto (Diagram 1) included all wants, 
desires, objectives, etc., upon the assumption that they all
have significant influence upon the decision making
structure. Empirically this is not the case. Most "wants",
especially in the communist state, simply exhibit nothing 
which even approximates direct influence upon the decision 
making structure while in the form of individual wants or 
even groups of wants. This is because they fail to become 
"politicized", or considered as potential outputs by the 
decision making structure.
The model here of course is interested only in 
"demands" at the national level. It is certainly true 
that "wants" may become "politicized" and satisfied by 
decision makers on lower, more local levels, especially
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when the "wants" are of comparatively little significance. 
This is the case, since on a much more minor scale there 
are "decision making structures" of a type at every level 
of society, especially in the form of communist party 
organizations which permeabe and parallel each and every 
stratum of the environment. Yet even if such "wants" 
are politically chanelled upward at local levels, they may 
be rejected at any higher stage and fail to become 
"demands", which are defined as "politicized wants" which 
have a substantially direct influence upon the national 
decision making structure in so far as they are considered 
as nationally determined "potential outputs". Therefore, 
previous to becoming "demands" within the national context 
of the model, "wants" only have the status of "potential" 
demands; if and when they fail to become demands (or if 
the demands are killed in some decision making structure), 
they remain simply "frustrated" wants.
Two points must be clarified however. I mentioned 
above that "non-politicized wants" (potential demands) 
have no direct influence by themselves upon the decision 
making structure. Yet at the same time, the model contends 
that they are instrumental for the all-important "stress 
area". The paradox arises from the confusion between 
"direct" and "indirect" influence upon the decision 
making structure. Directly, "wants" can rarely influence 
the national decision making structure in a communist
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state, since there is no mechanism provided for the 
mobilization and politicization of "wants", apart from the 
party hierarchy. (Indeed, it is within the very definition 
of "communist party" that it discourages such independent 
political activity.) However, indirectly this is not the 
case. As the following chapters will point out, I believe 
that there is ample behavioural evidence to confirm the 
hypothesis that due to the dissatisfaction resulting from 
this lack of political effectiveness of environmental 
wants, considerable "support" for the system is withdrawn, 
while simultaneously the quantity and strength of the "wants" 
increase, creating a larger "stress area" for the next 
round. This phenomenon assumes of course, that any substi­
tute outputs, especially of the "associative" or "propaganda" 
nature, are innefféctive. The dynamics of this process 
will be elaborated later.
The second point to be clarified is that which concerns 
the decision makers at the lower party levels within the 
environment. As already pointed out, the hierarchical 
arrangement of the communist party necessitates some 
decision making of a political nature at every level.
Since some communist party organization exists as an "alter 
ego" of every significant environmental group, whether 
formal or informal, the party organization is the most 
significant "aggregator" of wants; it provides the mechanics 
for synthesizing and grouping of selected wants and
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interests within the environment. Necessarily, in a 
totalitarian system, this same organization must provide 
for the controls over the "articulation" of these wants. 
For the purpose of the model here, interest or want 
"articulation" is defined as the conversion of a "want" 
into a "demand", or, in effect, politicizing a particular 
"aggregated want" which is believed by the lower level 
decision making structures to be of "potential output" 
significance.
Those party "representatives" or decision makers 
within the environment who decide which of the particular 
"wants" which are aggregated and filtered upward through 
the party hierarchy are to ultimately become "demands" 
upon the national decision making structure, are the
The "gates" are an extremely significant variable in 
the communist decision making process. As the diagram 
indicates, as the analysis suggests, and as the behavioural 
data verify, the "gates" present themselves as a barrier 
through which the environmental influences must get in 
order to be politically effective. The "gates" show that 
such influences from the environment do not automatically, 
or even with moderate difficulty, reach the decision 
making structure. Whereas there are institutional 
mechanisms, both formal and informal, guaranteed by the
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Western democratic system to assist and protect the 
legitimate political expression of environmental "wants", 
the reverse is the case in the communist state. The 
"gates" have the prime function of preventing such 
influences from making their weight felt upon the ultimate 
political decision making body. The "gatekeepers", being 
trustworthy, dedicated personnel well versed in the 
requisites of communist decision making, man the "gates" 
which screen most all potential demands which reach that 
level, to determine what political weight is to be 
accorded them. With regard to the environment, these 
party functionaries largely monopolize the power of 
politicization. Any "want" from either the party or non- 
party environment which a "gatekeeper" articulates, becomes 
a "demand" directly upon the decision making structure. 
Exactly who these individuals are, what offices they 
occupy, and what authority they possess, are questions 
which I will leave for the following chapters, where a 
more behaviourally rigorous and comparative analysis is 
convenient.
The "gates" are plural, representative of the many areas 
of decision making at the national level for which "potential 
demands" must be screened. At any one time, certain gates 
among them may be "open" in which case non-party interest 
aggregators within the environment (e.g. church hierarchy, 
leaders of youth groups, etc.,) may have direct influence
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upon the decision making structure ("v", ”w", "x", "y", "z"). 
In this case,these "aggregators" become their own 
"articulators" and are able to transform their "wants" 
into political demands (at the national level) without the 
difficulty of being screened by the party "gatekeepers".
This type of activity is rare in most communist countries, 
however it is not infrequent in the more "liberal" regimes 
(e.g. Czechoslovakia, January -August, 1968). This 
latter example represented the situation where the 
decision making structure may authorize certain gates to 
be left open, and in effect, invite direct politicization 
of wants from and by the environment. Another type of 
direct articulation however, is that whereby an environmental 
factor (such as the church hierarchy In Poland) is able to 
either "force" its way through the gates (by arousing 
enough environmental support) or has enough influence on 
its own to somehow get by the gates, despite the gatekeepers' 
efforts to prevent such influence.
Tbere is a definite relationship between the "stress 
area" and the "gates". In a Western democracy, wants are 
politicized much more directly, as pointed out above, 
since there is no substantial "gatekeeping" activity 
performed, and in so far as there are some barriers to 
more direct political influence, there are many legal and 
effective ways to circumvent them (e.g. mass demonstration, 
press publicity, etc.) Since wants can most always be
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politicized in Western democracy, then for all intents 
and purposes they can be equated with "political demands". 
Since the"gates" of the communist system are set up to 
prevent this, there is a tremendous number of "non- 
politicized wants" within the communist environment. To 
the extent that the outputs of the decision making structure 
are ineffective in one "round" (i.e. do not satisfy the 
major wants and fail to appease the environment in any 
other way), the supports for the system will decrease while 
the non-politicized wants tend to become at least qualitat­
ively stronger and eventually, quantitatively more abundant, 
resulting in a corresponding increase in environmental 
stress. If these activities prevail over successive 
"rounds" of the decision making process, the stress area 
will build up against the gates. Thus the pressure build­
up in the environment, although initially an adverse 
response to ineffective outputs, is also the result of 
the function of the%ates" to shield the decision making 
structure from the environment and prevent any "seepage" 
of environmental pressure toward the decision making 
structure. In effect, although the "gates" are designed 
to protect the decision making structure from the societal 
stress, they can, under certain circumstances, produce the 
opposite result. This situation will be analysed later in 
considerable detail, with the operation of the model in the 
"third dimension".
Once the environmental wants are articulated by the
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gatekeepers, tbey become politicized at the highest level, 
and, by definition, are considered as potential outputs 
by the decision making structure, after having been funelled 
through the "boundary threshold" to reach this small group 
of political actors. The "threshold" variable is the 
last element in the circular linkage of the decision making 
system and it is to a discussion of this element that I 
now turn.
The "boundary threshold" represents the distance 
between the decision making structure and the "gates" 
within the environment. This "distance" in the theoretical 
model is indicative of two necessarily related phenomena 
on the empirical level. First, it shows the "tightness"
(more orthodox) or "slackness" (liberalness) of control 
which is exercised by the decision making structure over 
the party and non-party elements in the environment with 
regard to inputs. When more strict and centralized 
control is deemed necessary by the decision making structure, 
this "distance" is substantially shortened; the more 
"liberal" and decentralized the control, the threshold 
distance is lengthened. These changes occur over a period 
of many "rounds" of decision making activity however; 
therefore I will elaborate upon the threshold activity 
further with the presentation of the three dimensional 
model.
The second and interdependently related aspect of the
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"threshold distance" is the corresponding gate activity. If 
the threshold distance is relatively great, indicating a 
more slack and decentralized control over the environmental 
inputs by a more liberal-oriented regime, this necessarily 
infers more open gates and more direct environmental 
influence upon the decision making structure. Conversely, 
in the case of a more orthodox, highly centralized "watch­
dog" control over environmental inputs, which is indicative 
of the more "Stalinist" type of regime, the situation will 
be "up tight", with a very short threshold distance, and 
the gates will tend to be closed, tightly locking out 
environmental influence. These situations also bear a 
definite relationship with the size of the "output area", 
since the relative environmental control exercised by 
the decision making structure in response to the input 
variable must be consistent with the administrative control 
and enforcement of the outputs.
This is particularly significant when considering the 
time element associated with the decision making. The 
shorter the threshold distance and, correspondingly, the 
greater the degree of gate closure, the less time the 
decision making structure will have to make effective 
decisions to prevent a pressure area from building up.
On the other hand, if the threshold distance is relatively 
great and the gates are "liberally" open, then the decision 
making structure will have more time with which to pro­
duce effective output combinations. This is the case.
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since, for example, in the latter situation the environment 
is exercising considerably more direct influence upon the 
decision making structure, and in a sense, the open gates 
allow pressure from the environment to dissipate. To this 
extent, the openness of gates represents a "safety valve" 
factor in the system, a means of partial control over the 
environmental pressure area. Furthermore, many of the 
environmental demands upon the decision making structure 
will be contradictory or mutually exclusive. This allows 
the decision making structure to legitimately stall 
certain output combinations since the environment has not 
generated homogeneous support for such demands. The 
environment, in turn, will be hesitant to create an increase 
in pressure since the source of the non-satisfied demands 
(ambivalence) is within the environment itself, not the 
decision making structure.
Such are the basic variables of the general "equil- 
ibrium" model of decision making on the national scale in 
communist East Europe. Now it is time to consider these 
variables together in linkage motion, and add the third 
dimension, the temporal element. The functional interactions 
rarely produce a 1:1 relationship between the interdependent 
variables concerned. Thus the state of "equilibrium" is 
more mythical and theoretical than actual and empirical. 
Consequently, the basic input - output mechanism is 
rarely balanced and the actions and reactions of variables 
are constantly in a state of flux. Thus only the "third
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dimension", that of successive "rounds" of decision 
making activity over a period of time, can give a 
realistic interpretation of the dynamics of the model.
During this "analysis in motion" however, it should 
also be kept in mind that the decision making structure 
is the "lock" which holds all the links of the functional 
chain together in circular form. Especially in the 
totalitarian state, where the key to power is in the 
hands of a uniquely omnipotent decision making group, this 
analogy obtains special significance. By the very concept 
of totalitarian power, the decision making structure can 
to a certain degree make or break any link in the chain.
C. THE MUDEL IN THE THIRD DIMENSION
Let us take as our starting point what I consider 
to be the "state of equilibrium" of the general model as 
represented in Diagram 3» In the state of equilibrium, 
the combination of authoritative and associative outputs is 
sufficiently effective to satisfy the environment such that 
the proportion of potential demands relative to supports does 
not change (i.e. the stress area remains stable). In 
addition, the gate activity remains similar to the previous 
round and the threshold distance is neither increased 
nor decreased substantially. Consequently, the equilibrium 
position presents a rather "static" round of decision 
making activity. There are very few changes since every
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disbalancing tendency is equally offset by a counter­
balancing action. For example, if certain demands from the 
environment are "killed" in the decision making structure, 
the potential effect upon the stress area of this "non­
output" may be offset by a successful associative output 
which is substituted by the decision making structure ; 
consequently, the decrease in system "supports" (in the 
environment), caused by the non-outputs frustration of 
wants, is restored by the associative output(s) designed 
to counterbalance the adverse effects. Since the stress 
area remains the same as in the previous round and assuming 
that the aims and attitudes of the decision making structure 
remain constant, there is no reason to change either the 
gate activity or the threshold distance. Such is the 
theoretical state of "equilibrium".
For purposes of analysis and demonstration of the 
third dimension however, I will introduce into this 
equilibrium position of the model a more realistic catalyst. 
After successive hypothetical "rounds" of equilibrium 
activity, let us suppose that the combination of outputs, 
both associative and authoritative, are generally ineffective 
or at least perceived to be so by the environment. In 
this first round of ineffective outputs (Diagram 4(a)), 
the environmental stress area will tend to expand slightly 
due to the initial adverse feedback response to such 
ineffectiveness. The balance of supports and potential 
demands is upset in the letter's favour. Since the
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"stress area" is crucial here, it must be stated now 
that the behavioural evidence suggests that crisis pro-
portions are not reached until after several successive 
rounds of output ineffectiveness, both quantitative and 
qualitative, followed by corresponding "de facto" changes 
in pressure area build-up. This is due to the built-in 
"structural lag" in the workings of this aspect of the 
decision making process. As pointed out earlier, there 
is no (xtensive network of facilities available in the 
communist environment which promotes and encourages the 
effective politicization of dissatisfaction, as there 
exists in Western democracy. On the contrary, the structure 
of the system is such that organized environmental influence 
is deliberately discouraged. The "alter ego" party 
organizations paralleling every significant group at every 
societal level, effectively prevent any form of organized 
pressure from occurring. Similarly, within the party, 
each level of party organization is surveying and criti­
cizing the one below to prevent any such "reactionary" 
activity. Thus both horizontally and vertically, independent 
environmental pressure is systematically thwarted, 
Resultingly, it usually takes several "rounds" of ineffec- 
tive decision making in the communist system before the 
pressure area is large enough and strong enough to overcome 
these structural barriers to the political expression of 
environmental dissatisfaction.
Therefore, although the pressure area may increase
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slightly in the first round of ineffective outputs, there 
will be no other significant changes. If second and third 
rounds of decision making fail to satisfy the environments 
major demands however, there will be severe digressions 
from the equilibrium state, characterized by the growing 
pressure area, closing of the gates, tightening of party 
control over the input variable (reducing the threshold' 
distance), proportionate increase in the "withinput" 
factor over the "input" factor from the environment, and a 
more strict administration of outputs, i.e. a larger 
output area (Diagram 4(b)).
A careful analysis, step by step, is warranted here. 
Since third round outputs were again decidedly ineffective, 
the growing level of expressed dissatisfaction in the 
environment is catching up with the successive rounds of 
ineffectiveness, and is expressed by the significant growth 
in potential demands and proportionate shrinkage of supports. 
The reaction of the decision making structure to this 
adverse growth of environmental pressure must necessarily 
include a further closing of the gates to protect their 
own power position. At the same time, the boundary threshold 
will be drawn closer; party control over the society will 
have to be more strict to keep the environmental pressures 
from errupting.
Necessarily of course, if the previous direct
environmental influence is curtailed by the closing
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activity of the gates, there will be less significant 
input factor from the environment (only "x" and "z") 
and both the number and proportion of withinputs to inputs 
will increase. Another reason for this is the tendency 
of the decision making structure to increase outputs in 
hope of alleviating some of the environmental pressure.
In addition, to give the outputs the best chance of 
reducing this pressure in the environment, the party 
bureaucracy and administrative organization will have to 
implement these outputs with decidedly more control to 
achieve more effectiveness. Thus the output area will 
also increase both quantitatively and qualitatively, to 
control more effectively the administration of those 
outputs so that maximum value can be obtained therefrom.
This enlarged output area however, is the beginning 
of round four, let us again assume that the output 
combination is generally ineffective, in which case all of 
the adverse trends in round two and three are strengthened. 
Diagram 4(c) indicates the functional variations which 
have occurred due to further ineffective rounds of decision 
making (R4, H6). The proportion of potential demands
to supports is about as high as it can get. (There will 
always be some supports for the system, especially of 
the "old guard loyalty" variety). Thus the "stress area" 
reaches crisis proportions. The gates will be closed 
solidly and the threshold distance will be as short as 
possible. Consequently, party control over environmental
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influences will be as tight and rigorous as can be.
There will still be demands from the environment, but they 
will be as a result of the growing pressure area and will 
be cautiously filtered by the party and articulated only 
by the "gatekeepers". Behavioural evidence suggests that 
this situation is also characterized by a certain distrust 
in the party decision making structure. Consequently, 
some or all members of the decision making structure may 
even become the "gatekeepers" themselves.
The disbalancing "snowball" movement should now be 
apparent. One adverse reaction feeds another. The in- 
effective output combination assists the growth of the 
pressure area, which in turn promotes gate closing activity 
(just when they should be left open to relieve the 
pressure). This in turn justifies a further tightening 
of party controls (over inputs) which warrants a propor- 
tionate increment of withinputs resulting in an increase 
and stronger enforcement of outputs which are disadvantaged 
to begin with in a more hostile environment. Thus it can 
be readily seen that there seems to be lacking any inherent 
structural balancing mechanisms as there exist in the 
Western Democratic process.
The decision making structure at this point is in 
trouble. The job of the decision making structure is to 
make decisions, in effect, to govern. No government can 
exist for long, no matter how totalitarian, if it continues
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to render ineffective decisions, decisions which do not 
solve problems but only feed them. The "stress feedback"
snowballs and over a number of rounds the system approaches 
the structural explosion point.
Let us assume however, that the system does not explode, 
but rather that the decision making structure at round 
seven manages to come up with an output combination 
which begins to satisfy many of the environmental "wants" 
which have accumulated over the previous six rounds.
This may have little immediate effect upon the stress 
area since the lagged dissatisfaction from rounds five 
and six may just be "catching up" at this point and making 
their weight felt. Also, if the period of prolonged 
dissatisfaction was considerably lengthy, the environment 
will not usually respond more favourably at the outset.
After all, party controls and environmental suppression 
are still exercised within the environment to a large 
degree at this point. There may be therefore a certain 
element of environmental distrust toward the system, or 
at least a "wait-and-see" attitude.
Nevertheless, the time lag in the environmental 
response to satisfactory or effective outputs should be 
shorter than the lag in registering the adverse response.
This seems to be true since there are specific structures 
and procedures built into the administrative machinery to 
promote and encourage the satisfaction of outputs within
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7 6
the environment. As much as environmental dissatisfaction 
of and participation in decision making is discouraged by 
the system, acceptance of and satisfaction with the 
outputs, once they are promulgated, are stronly encouraged. 
Thus the "satisfaction lag" will in fact usually be consid- 
erably shorter than the "dissatisfaction lag".
Assuming that an effective output combination is 
forthcoming in round eight, some ameliorating tendencies 
may then begin to show, as demonstrated by Diagram 5(a),
In this situation, the reverse influences are apparent.
The effectiveness of the output combination will generate 
a favourable "feedback balance" in which the adverse 
proportion of potential demands to the level of supports 
will be reduced; thus diminishing the pressure area 
somewhat. At this point however, the pressure area, 
although no longer of crisis proportions, is still large. 
Consequently, there will be little change in the closed 
gates, and relatively strict party control over both the 
input and output areas will remain.
Although all outputs will emanate directly from 
withinputs at this stage, there will be fewer withinput 
demands which are actually promulgated. The output 
combination of round seven was relatively effective, 
therefore there will be less pressure upon the system to 
find output solutions which are satisfactory. Resultingly, 
more of the withinput demands will be "killed" by the
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decision making structure itself during this round.
Successive rounds of effective output combinations 
will have a more significant effect upon these variables. 
Diagram 5(b) illustrates the situation at the end of round 
ten, or the fourth successive round of "generally effective" 
outputs. Here, the successive rounds of want satisfaction 
have caught up with and have overcome the previous rounds of 
dissatisfaction, causing a shift in the proportion of 
potential demands to the level of supports, but this time 
in favour of the latter. Consequently, the "stress area" 
is significantly reduced.
Behaviourally however, the decision making structure 
is much more reluctant to withdraw strict controls than 
the environment is to withdraw its dissatisfaction with 
previous outputs. To guarantee greater control over the 
system and reassure the decision making structure of a 
tranquil environment, only partial relaxation of control 
will usually be accorded at this round. Some gates may 
be reopened to allow some direct environmental influence 
and the boundary threshold may be extended somewhat. If 
distrust of the environment still prevails however, 
these concessions may be more of a "nominal" type than 
real. Similarly, the output area may be decreased somewhat, 
as the decision making structure feels that the situation 
warrants.
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Diagram 5(c) carries this ameliorating trend to its 
obvious conclusion. Over a period of time, during which 
the output combinations remain at least satisfactory, the 
distrust of the environment by the decision making structure 
may wain, and the situation approaches that which may be 
termed "liberal". Successive rounds of effective output 
combinations have resulted in a most favourable proportion 
of potential demands and supports within the environment, 
heavily favouring the latter. The potential demand factor 
is not strong and the legitimacy accorded the entire system 
of government by the environment is generally high; therefore 
the "stress area" is near a minimum.
The decision making structure, in consideration of 
a most favourable environmental response to the processes 
of the system, and wishing to avoid any recurrence of 
build-up in the "stress area", will open as many gates 
as is feasible. It should be noted however, that this 
does not remove the party structures from the environment; 
they still exist as before, with the exception that their 
controlling activities are less severe. However, since 
there are more legitimate channels of direct influence 
open to the non-party environment, the proportion of 
inputs channeled by the party structure as compared to 
inputs from the non-party environment (which by-pass the 
gates and influence the decision making structure directly), 
is lessened to some degree. In effect then, as discussed 
earlier, this necessarily means a lengthened threshold
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distance and a relaxation of party controls over both the 
party and non-party environment with regard to the input 
variable.
In turn then, there will be a much larger influx of 
demands from the environment, coming either directly through 
open gates or through the established party channels and 
gatekeepers. Consequently, the top-heavy proportion of 
withinputs to inputs is reduced and the environment becomes 
relatively more influential in the decision making process. 
Since the subsequent outputs are legitimately more of a 
product of the environment, the latter’s favourable 
acceptance of the output combination will be more likely. 
This being the case, rigorous party controls over strict 
implementation and enforcement of the outputs are not 
necessary. Also, due to the high level of supports and 
legitimacy accorded the system, the quantity of outputs 
(exclusive of international outputs) may be decreased, 
especially those of the "associative" character. For 
these reasons, the "output area" will be substantially 
reduced as well.
D. SOME ANALYTICAL REFINEMENTS
Such are the dynamics of the model in the third 
dimension. There are some misconceptions however, which 
may arise from the diagramatic presentation, and so it is 
to these that I now turn for some discussion and
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clarification.
The concept of "rounds", although clearly perceived 
in the diagramatic version of the model, is much less 
obvious on the empirical level. Decision making is a 
continuous procedure in any system; this is the prime 
function for which the system was set up. The diagramatic 
version may suggest that when a group of decisions have 
been made (i.e. an output combination), no other decisions 
are taken until that group completes the circular process.
If this were in fact the case, there would be no difficulties 
of empirical identification. However, as the behavioural 
data will confirm, output combinations may intercede 
with others. For example, "output combination one" may 
be promulgated and only part way through the feedback 
process when "output combination two" is promulgated. A 
third output group may follow closely upon "combination 
two" and, due to its more limited scope, ease of imple­
mentation, etc., may actually supercede groups one and 
two and complete the process first. Thus, the "successive 
rounds" of which I discussed earlier are more likely to 
be imperfectly successive, with much overlapping and 
overtaking. Consequently, the rounds are "fuzzy" from an 
empirical standpoint, sometimes necessitating a distinction 
between "rounds" in theory and "rounds" in practice.
Yet this is not a serious drawback since we are 
concerned with the national scope of the decision making
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process of communist East Europe. The decisions made 
on this level are usually very "large" (e.g. the adoption 
of a long term "plan") which provide the investigator 
with a relatively easy task of tracing and behaviourally 
verifying and accounting for the data which accrue.
Another variable warranting further discussion at 
this point is the "stress factor". As pointed out 
earlier, the "stress area" is not solely representative 
of the level of "potential demands", but rather the 
proportion of which results from the feedbacks "clearing 
house" operation. If this is the case, a problem seems 
to arise from the analysis of Diagram 5(a), (b) and (c).
It is behaviourally apparent that there can be no limit 
to "wants" or "potential demands". Although output 
combinations may be generally effective, out of sheer 
optimism (or whatever reason) in the environment, potential 
demands may certainly increase, while the level of supports 
remains constant. If this is so, one may point out that:
1) the stress area is simply a function of potential
demand (and not of a proportion between the
potential demands and level of supports);
2) and therefore. Increases in the "stress area"
are unlimited since "wants" are limitless.
The above problem arises if one fails to take proper 
account of the distinction between "basic" wants and 
"non-basic" wants. It is this qualitative difference
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which is most significant as a catalyst of the "stress 
area", not simply the quantity of wants put forth from 
the environment, Let me illustrate more clearly.
Let us hypothesize an equilibrium situation where 
total inputs of "1Ü0 units" are comprised of "50 units" 
of supports and "50 units" of potential demands. The 
50 units of supports represents the "satisfactory" 
level of support resulting from previous output effec­
tiveness. The 50 units of potential demand represent 
current interests, wants, etc., in the environment.
Suppose that out of these 50 units of potential demand, 
there are 25 units of basic wants (enough food to live on, 
enough clothes, housing and protection) and 25 units of 
non-basic wants (electric toothbrushes, the latest fashions 
from Paris, etc.,) Now there are three possible situations,
First, if the decision making structure promulgates 
an output combination which satisfies only the 25 units 
of basic wants, then resulting supports for the system (at 
the "equilibrium stage") will remain approximately the 
same, since "major" or "basic" wants are satisfied.
The "stress area" also remains primarily the same since 
the behavioural evidence will prove, as the theory of the 
"economic rationale" illustrates, that individuals will 
not increase pressure upon the system by either a change 
in their "potential demands" or their "supports", if their 
basic wants remain satisfied. Therefore the "frustration"
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of non-basic wants does not create a crisis condition.
The second situation which may arise is that in 
which the output combination does not satisfy the 2$ units 
of basic wants, but rather the 25 units of non-basic wants. 
In this case, supports for the system will decrease and 
the unsatisfied wants will become stronger, creating a 
substantial increase in the pressure area. Even though 
an equal quantity of the non-basic wants are satisfied 
(i.e. 25 wants), the frustrated "basic" wants will be 
reinforced, since an electric toothbrush has little 
utility if one has no food. It can readily be seen 
therefore, that as the economic rationale indicates, wants 
are ordered by the individual, and one will only be 
politically satisfied if the mo:re important, more "basic" 
wants are fulfilled.
The third situation represents the case where the 
output combinations are able to satisfy both the basic and 
the non-basic wants. It is then probable that supports 
may become even higher than if just the basic wants are 
satisfied. (Supports, similar to "wants", are theoretically 
quantitatively unlimited). Due to optimism in the 
environment, it may also be said that this situation 
may create an even larger number of wants. This is 
undoubtedly true since it is obvious that many luxury 
wants can be added to the wants expressed in the previous 
rounds. Yet this will not significantly effect the
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"stress area" if these wants are frustrated.
It should be clear therefore, that as long as basic 
wants are satisfied, the stress area will never reach 
crisis proportions. There is a possibility of "surplus 
supports" (in the event that non-basic wants are satisfied 
in addition to the basic wants), as well as a loss of 
"surplus supports" (if these non-basic or "surplus" wants are 
not satisfied). Yet the basic stability of the system 
derives from "basic" supports from the environment, and 
this "basic support" is a result of output satisfaction 
of "basic wants". "Surplus" wants and supports therefore 
only have a quantitative significance; the frustration of 
even thousands of surplus wants will hot create a crisis 
situation, while the prolonged frustration of one truly 
basic want very well may!
In summary then, the "stress area" in the model is 
primarily a correlation between output satisfaction of 
basic wants and basic supports. There may be a quantitative 
increase in non-basic wants "ad infinitum", but as long as 
basic wants are satisfied, this will not create a significant 
increase in the pressure area unless at some point of time 
they become qualitatively significant (i.e. basic) in their 
own right.
It should also be noted that the quality of "basicness" 
of wants varies from one environment to another. In less
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developed societies, basic wants are essentially "enough 
food", "adequate clothing", "protection", etc. In a more 
advanced society, these things may be taken for granted; 
basic wants will be of a higher nature (e.g. the automobile 
becomes a "necessity", as well as education, telephones, 
and health insurance).
A word should also be said of the relationship between 
the "stress area" and the economic rationale which was a 
subject of discussion earlier. As was pointed out in PART I, 
the individuals in the environment surrender their ability 
to give "free play" to their respective "utility streams" 
to the decision making structure. This does not however, 
deny the existence of interests or "utility streams" in 
individuals in the environment. What it does mean is that 
these utility streams rarely exercise direct influence 
upon the decision making structure; this is inherent in the 
definition of the totalitarian system. Yet the individuals, 
collectively, may influence such decision making indirectly 
by altering the "stress area" variable. Every individual 
will exert "wants" (but not necessarily demands) in their 
order of priority in their particular "utility stream". 
Obviously, as indicated by the "rationale" and behaviourally 
substantiated, the more basic wants will have priority 
over the less basic, since the more basic or more important 
wants will render greater utility. Therefore collectively, 
to the degree that basic want strength is generalized 
over the environment as a whole, the stress area will
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
86
increase, thus applying indirect pressure upon the 
decision making structure.
1 believe this should eliminate the significant 
misunderstandings which may arise from the model itself. 
With these clarified, I will now present the final model,
E. THE INTERNATIONAL ELEMENT
It would not require a very exhaustive accumulation of 
behavioural evidence to demonstrate the significance of 
international influence upon the decision making structures 
of the East European communist societies. Since these 
political systems sprung from common origins during and 
after World War II, owing their birth to the same communist 
source and their "allegiance" to their original parent, 
the U.S.S.R., can be readily understood. Such "allegiance" 
need not necessarily be voluntary, as the events in Poland 
and Hungary in 19^6 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 testify.
It is certainly true however, that the last two 
decades have brought many changes within what is generally 
understood to be the "socialist camp", perhaps the most 
significant being the evolutionary changes in communism, 
both ideologically and in practice, and its subsequent 
splitting into two major and several minor forms. 
Consequently, allegiance to and influence of the "camp" 
have also split, making the lines of international
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socialist command and obedience somewhat hazy, irregular, 
and unstable. Yet even in the present, as was evidenced 
by the invasion of Czechoslovakia, international influence 
upon national decision making still exists, although the 
strength of such influence seems to vary from one country 
to another. Of the East European group, Yugoslavia has 
succeeded in perhaps being at least relatively independent, 
although more subtle Soviet influences are still exerted 
upon her. Albania has not become much more independent, 
but rather has switched her lines of allegiance from the 
Soviet Union to the People's Republic of China. Even 
Roumania, within certain limits, has managed to escape 
some of the undesireable international influence by virtue 
of her strong economic interests.
Yet by the very fact that they are "possessions"
of the Soviet Union, derived from post-war political 
card dealings, and that they represent strategic areas of 
influence to the U.S.S.R., there remains a very significant 
international element in each of their internal decision 
making processes. The model in its final form as Diagram 6 
illustrates, is identical to that of Diagram 5, but with 
the international variable added.
Although the international influence is also represented 
as basically an input-output principle, there are some 
significant changes in the entire model. Since the model
is now concerned with an international environment as well
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as a national one, there will necessarily be a "split 
feedback", registering both internal and external environ­
mental responses to the output combination. The national 
"control" (via the output area) over the effectiveness 
of any East European state's output combination, will of 
course be substantially limited to the internal environment.
No East European country can enforce its outputs upon the 
decision making structure of the international environment.
The decision making structure(s) of the international 
environment will generally consist of those of the socialist 
camp, and may be dominated by one among them (e.g. the 
U.S.S.R.) They are presented in the model collectively 
for diagramatic convenience; however, analytically, the 
international decision making structure may often be 
plural, since any one of the East European communist 
decision making structures may be subject to the influence 
of several others collectively.
The outputs of any East European communist state
provide the material for inputs into the decision making 
structure(s) of the international environment (predominately 
of the nature of "supports"). There will be no "gatekeeping" 
activity however, and hence no boundary threshold concept, 
since "inputs" will be directly communicated and "politi­
cized" between the national decision making structure 
(or more often the national environment) and the international 
decision making structure(s). However, there very well may
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be a "pressure area" build-up on the input side of the 
international decision making structure, since the "camp 
leadership" (e.g. the Soviet Union) has as its goal, the 
maintenance of its own power and influence over the rest 
of the camp. Therefore the individual East European 
communist states may exert some pressure upon the "camp" 
decision making structure(s) (e.g. that they produce less 
heavy equipment for the "camp" and more consumer goods 
for their own people).
A brief analysis of the Czechoslovakian crisis of 
August, 1968 may be illustrative here. The Czechoslovakian 
decision making structure, between January and August 1968, 
promulgated output combinations which were very satisfactory 
to the internal environment, resulting in a very low 
national pressure area, relatively open "gates", a large 
threshold distance, and a less lopsided proportion of 
withinputs to inputs. In effect, Czechoslovakia presented 
that syndrome of conditions which would indicate a 
"liberal" regime. However, these same output combinations 
during this period failed to generate similar tendencies 
in the international sphere. On the contrary, the international 
feedback created a buildup in the pressure area of the 
international system; the Czechoslovakian output combinations 
reflected a "de facto" loss of supports relative to demands, 
and hence a loss of political influence of the "camp" 
leadership over Czechoslovakia. Innevitably, the inter­
national decision making structure(s) (nominally the
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"Warsaw Pact Alliance", but in fact the Soviet Union), 
countered:with international outputs, especially of the
associative variety, derived mainly from "withinputs" 
designed to relieve the "stress area". These internal 
outputs became direct inputs to the Czechoslovakian 
decision making structure. After successive rounds of 
ineffective international output combinations (and 
subsequent "stress build-up") the international output 
area expanded also. In addition, the international 
outputs became decidedly authoritative in character, 
resulting in the direct enforcement of these outputs 
by the international decision making structure(s)
(i.e. invasion and military enforcement). The international 
decision making structure(s) subsequently followed up 
with output combinations which were predominatly "associative" 
in character, designed to legitimize the authoritative- 
military activity and reduce the stress area being built 
up by the adverse responses by both communist and non- 
communist states. Following the invasion, the decision 
making structure of Czechoslovakia was forced to reorient 
its national output combinations towards a more orthodox 
content. The "gates" in the Czechoslovakian decision 
making processes were to be closed for the most part, and 
the threshold distance shortened. Withinputs regained 
their lopsided advantage over inputs from the environment, 
and as could be predicted, the ensuing output combinations 
failed to satisfy the environment, resulting in a certain 
level of internal stress buildup.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
91
This brief treatment of tne Czechoslovakian crisis 
more factually and empirically demonstrates two points that 
should now be evident from this phase of the model. First, 
the mechanism of the international element clearly operates 
upon the same principles as that of the typical decision 
making system on the national level, with only the few 
variations discussed. Second, and even more significant, is 
the fact that no model of communism, especially of Eastern 
Europe, can possibly be considered complete without taking 
full account of the international variable; linkage between 
the decision making structure of the national state and 
that of the parallel structure(s) on the international 
scene is much too sbrong to be ignored.
With regard to the overall model, and within the scope 
of its original two-fold objective, it will succeed in 
great measure if it contributes even towards the intelligent 
awareness of the significance of the interrelationship 
between the political and the non-political aspects of 
society, between the behaviour of men in politics on the 
one hand and their more distinctly socio-economic and psycho­
logical activities on the other. Unfortunately, time and 
space have prevented me from engaging in the latter, 
especially the sociological element, in very great detail; 
but that is quite another thesis. Notwithstanding this 
omission, I believe that I have at least substantiated 
the case for the need for political scientists to account 
for and integrate these other social behaviours in order
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to arrive at a more meaningful, contextual, science of
politics.
By way of a concluding statement, and more specifically 
in a communist vein, I think the model presented clearly 
demonstrates that in addition to the more precise descrip­
tive, explanatory, and predictive merits obtained, this 
type of analysis is capable of profoundly integrating the 
elements of modern communism with the intangible variables 
of social change. Communist societies have been established 
on the premise of achieving considerably different social 
cultural objectives than the polities which preceded them.
In striving toward the realization of these goals they 
rely on a perpetuation of their political rule by rooting 
their power in a minority group of dedicated militants 
who in turn monopolize control over all means of coercion, 
communication and social organization. However, it is now 
clear that their propensity to reach their objectives, 
and even to survive, cannot be anchored on their widely 
touted organizational ability or Stalinist suppresion 
of resistance. They can never succeed in ultimately 
escaping the cleavaging aspects inherent in human society 
or isolating themselves from the forces of social change. 
Long run viability, even in the sommunist society, will 
necessarily be a function of their capacity to obtain 
the popular acceptance of their legitimacy, their persuance 
of goals which adequately satisfy the expectations of the 
masses, and their talent in remedying social conflict
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without jeopardizing the dominant role of the party.
As the East European situation testifies, the 
communist leaders and parties are finding it more and more 
difficult to sustain their authority in an increasingly 
hostile and intolerant social environment characterized 
by industrial development, increasing pressure for bureau­
cratic and professional pluralism, rising intellectual 
discontent, and cumulative popular demands for higher 
living standards. These countries cannot avoid the 
environmental complexities which accompany industrial 
modernity; and there is no social magic in the term "demo­
cratic centralism". The power which emanates from the 
barrel of a gun only provides for a transitory and inchoate 
control over society; if the modern communist nations 
are to survive this century, they will have to master the 
laws of socio-economic change or else bow to the crises 
which such a failing will precipitate. It is toward 
gaining a more realistic and yet sufficiently sophisticated 
body of knowledge of this too long abandoned and yet all- 
important perspective, that this paper is dedicated.
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